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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a single woman of limited means living with her two children 
in an apartment complex. The resident manager would like to go out with 
her or, to put it less euphemistically, would like to have a sexual 
relationship with her. Initially, he approaches the matter subtly by 
complimenting the woman on her appearance and offering to do special 
maintenance favors for her. Eventually, he asks her out. When she 
refuses, he becomes verbally hostile, calling her a "tease" and a "bitch." 
Thereafter, he threatens to evict her unless she has sex with him. The 
threat is not carried out, but the manager is now unpleasant in his 
exchanges with the tenant. She tries to avoid seeing him around the 
apartment complex, but when he comes to her unit to collect the rent, he 
often makes crude or sexually suggestive remarks such as "you could make 
this pay day so much nicer for both of us. ,,1 
Do the nation's fair housing laws prohibit any or all of what the 
manager has done in this situation? To date, the courts have generally 
answered "No,,,2 a conclusion that we contend has mistakenly ignored a 
crucial provision of the federal housing discrimination law and needlessly 
encouraged repetition of scenarios like the one described above. 
Sexual harassment in housing is a significant national problem. 3 
Although less visible than the comparable problem in employment, sexual 
1. The scenario described here is a fictional amalgamation of various actual fair 
housing harassment cases, primarily DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d to04 (7th Cir. 1996). 
See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra Part I.B.3. 
3. Commentators and fair housing enforcement officials generally agree that 
housing harassment is a problem of serious magnitude. E.g., Interview with Joan Magagna, 
Chief of Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice, in Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2002); Interview with David H. Enzel, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Programs, Office of Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity, U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, in Washington, D.C. 
(June 24,2002); Interview with Shanna L. Smith, President/CEO, National Fair Housing 
Alliance, in Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2002). We have found that providing documentary 
support for this conclusion is difficult, however. For example, HUD's reports on 
administrative complaints filed each year under the federal Fair Housing Act lump together 
all sex-based claims, thereby making it impossible to identify the number of claims 
involving sexual harassment as distinguished from other types of sex discrimination claims. 
See, e.g., OFFICE OF PROGRAM STANDARDS & EVALUATlON, U.S. DEP'TOFHous. & URBAN 
DEV., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING PROGRAMS 26 (1996). The 
only source that we are aware of that has ever attempted to provide a statistical basis for the 
number of such claims is an article published fifteen years ago in the Wisconsin Law 
Review, which reported a survey of housingcenters around the country that learned of 288 
cases of sexual harassment in housing that had been reported to these centers. See Regina 
Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 
WIS. L. REV. to61, to66. Noting studies which indicate that sexual harassment in the 
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harassment in housing may be as prevalent and probably more devastating 
to its victims. 4 
Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been paid to this issue or to 
the law that should govern it. Indeed, the law of sexual harassment in 
housing developed well after and in virtual lock -step with the law of sexual 
harassment in employment.s Thus, courts have simply interpreted the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA)6 to prohibit sexual harassment to the same degree-and 
only to the same degree-as it is prohibited in employment by Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 7 
This is inappropriate. It is true that the FHA contains a "terms and 
conditions" provision that parallels the one in Title VII that has been the 
key to sexual harassment law in employment. 8 But the FHA also contains 
an additional provision-§ 3604(c)9-that bans sexually discriminatory 
statements in a way that goes well beyond its Title VII counterpart. 10 The 
availability of § 3604(c) as an additional weapon in the arsenal against 
sexual harassment in housing-and its lack of use by courts and litigants-
is the subject of this Article. 
One example of the failure to fully appreciate that the FHA's ban on 
sexual harassment may go further than Title VII's is the determination by 
various federal courts to reject liability in cases where the defendant's 
behavior was not egregious enough to warrant a "terms and conditions" 
violation, but should have been held to violate § 3604(c).1l While these 
decisions may be correct in applying Title VII law to sexual harassment 
workplace is reported less than 5 % of the time, Cahan estimated that these 288 reported 
cases amounted to less than 5% of the actual number of illegal incidents, which was put at 
between 6,818 and 15,000. [d. at 1069. Cahan further noted that these estimates based on 
employment data may be disproportionately low for two reasons. [d. at 1067-69. First, 
unlike in cases of workplace harassment, the public is not as aware of the legal protections 
and enforcement mechanisms available to address housing harassment, and thus victims 
would undoubtedly be less likely to come forward. [d. at 1069. Second, victims of housing 
harassment may fear more serious repercussions for themselves and their families if they 
report the harassment-eviction or even physical harm-than do victims of workplace 
harassment. [d. at 1067. 
4. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text; see also Michelle Adams, 
Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17,44-48 
(1998); Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The 
Misfit Application of Title VII Employment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW 
& INEQ. 351,368-73 (2000). 
5. See infra Part LB. 
6. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994) (codifying Title VIII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
8. See 42 U .S.C. § 3604(b) (FHA); 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII). 
These provisions are discussed in greater detail infra Parts I.B.1-2. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). 
10. See infra Parts I.D. and II.B. 
11. See cases cited infra notes 72-74, 80-83, 85-86. 
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claims based on the FHA's "terms and conditions" provision, they have 
erred in failing to also consider § 3604(c), which prohibits even isolated 
discriminatory housing statements. 12 The error is often traceable to the 
sexual harassment plaintiffs themselves, who have generally not asserted a 
§ 3604(c) claim along with their other FHA claims. 13 
This Article argues that § 3604(c) is applicable in virtually every 
sexual harassment case involving housingl4 and that its applicability means 
the FHA can be a more effective statute for attacking sexual harassment 
than Title VII. Part I reviews the law governing sexual harassment in 
housing, including the role that Title VII precedents have had in shaping 
this law. Part II shows how § 3604( c) goes further than its Title VII 
counterpart in prohibiting statements that are often at the heart of a sexual 
harassment claim and identifies some specific situations in which § 3604(c) 
may be helpful in challenging sexual harassment that would otherwise not 
be illegal. Finally, Part III deals with the potential First Amendment 
problems that may arise if § 3604(c) were applied to cases involving verbal 
sexual harassment. 
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
A. Overview of the Fair Housing Act and Its Similarity to Title VII 
As originally enacted in 1968, the FHA banned discrimination in most 
residential dwellings on the basis of race, color, religion, and national 
origin. 15 An amendment adding "sex" to the FHA's list of prohibited bases 
of discrimination was passed in 1974. 16 
Most of the FHA's basic substantive prohibitions have remained 
unchanged since 1968.17 For purposes of this Article, four of these 
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra note 108 (describing how frequently statements are part of housing 
sexual harassment). Indeed, this provision may be the only part of the statute that will apply 
to many housing harassment situations. See infra Parts I.B.3 and I.D. 
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-3607,3617 (1970). Certain dwellings are exempted 
from the FHA's substantive coverage. See § 3603(b) (exempting from most of § 3604 
certain single-family houses sold or rented by their owners and units in owner-occupied 
apartment buildings containing four or fewer units) and § 3607(a) (exempting certain 
dwellings operated by religious organizations and private clubs). 
16. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 
§ 808, 88 Stat. 633, 728 (1974). Two additional bases of discrimination-"familial status" 
and "handicap"-were added by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988). 
17. The FHA's substantive prohibitions are contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 
and 3617. See id. § 3602(0 (defining a "discriminatory housing practice" for purposes of 
the FHA as an act that is unlawful under §§ 3604-3606 and 3617). The only changes that 
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substantive provisions are particularly important: § 3604(a) makes it
unlawful to refuse to sell, rent, or negotiate for the sale or rental of, or to
"otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race [or other prohibited factor]"; § 3604(b) supplements § 3604(a)'s ban
on refusals to deal by prohibiting discrimination in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling and in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith; § 3604(c) prohibits
discriminatory notices, statements, and advertising; and § 3617 outlaws
coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference with the rights guaranteed
by §§ 3604-3606.s
The language of all four of these crucial provisions is similar, but not
identical, to comparable prohibitions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the federal employment discrimination law that was passed four
years before the FHA. 9 For example, Title VII's key substantive
prohibition makes it unlawful for an employer both to "refuse to hire or to
discharge" and "otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment "2 -practices that roughly correspond to the FHA's
prohibitions of discriminatory refusals to deal and discriminatory terms and
conditions in § 3604(a) and § 3604(b). Title VII also prohibits employers
from publishing "any notice or advertisement . . . indicating any
have been made to these substantive prohibitions since 1968 were the addition of sex,
familial status, and handicap as illegal bases of discrimination, see supra note 16 and
accompanying text, and some amendments-not relevant to this Article-made by the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, such as broadening the scope of § 3605's ban on
discriminatory home financing, providing a special set of handicap-related provisions in §
3604(f), adding an exemption for reasonable occupancy restrictions in § 3607(b)(1), and
exempting housing for older persons from the new familial status prohibitions in § 3607(b).
Fair Housing Amendments Act, §§ 5-6, 102 Stat. at 1619-23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
3604(f), 3605, 3607(b)(1) and 3607(b) (1994)). The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
also made major changes to the FHA's enforcement procedures. See §§ 7-8, 102 Stat. at
1623-35. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3614 (1994)). See generally James A. Kushner,
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1049 (1989).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(c), 3617. The FHA's other substantive provisions
are § 3604(d), which bans discriminatory misrepresentations concerning the availability of
housing; § 3604(e), which outlaws "blockbusting"; § 3604(f), which contains a number of
provisions designed to provide equal housing opportunities for handicapped persons; §
3605, which prohibits discrimination in home loans and certain other housing-related
transactions; and § 3606, which bans discrimination in multiple-listing and other brokerage
services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(d)-(f), 3605-3606.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The 1964 Civil Rights Act also prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations, see id. § 2000a, and federally funded programs,
see id. § 2000d, but these prohibitions are much shorter and simpler than those of Title VII
and therefore not nearly as comparable to the FHA as Title VII.
20. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination,",2 a provision that
is directed against some of the same discriminatory practices outlawed by §
3604(c), although, as we shall see, the latter provision is significantly
broader than its Title VII counterpart.22 Finally, Title VII prohibits
retaliation against those who have exercised their rights under the
employment statute,2 3 a provision that is somewhat similar to § 3617's
protections against coercion and interference. 4
B. The Role of Title VII Law in Housing Cases
1. TITLE VII LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Cases recognizing that harassment in employment might violate Title
VII date back at least to 1971.5 In the latter 1970s, "l[t]he topic of sexual
harassment in the workplace exploded upon the scene. '26 In 1980, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines
identifying sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by
21. Id. § 2000e-3(b).
22. See infra Part III.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
24. Id. § 3617. There are other major similarities between Title VII and the FHA.
Both statutes prohibit discrimination "because of" race and certain other factors, leading
courts to conclude that the standards of proof under the two laws should be interpreted in a
similar fashion. See, e.g., cases cited at ROBERT G. SCHiWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 10:2 n.25, 10:3 nn.27-28, 10:4(1) nn. 18-21, 10:6 n. 15 (2001). In
addition, both statutes include exemptions for religious organizations, private clubs, and
small operators. See supra note 15 (FHA exemptions), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a), §
2000e(b)(2), and § 2000e(b) (Title VII exemptions). As a result of the various similarities
and the parallel goals of Title VII and the FHA, courts have generally seen fit to interpret
them consistently with one another. See SCHWEMM, supra, § 7:4.
25. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (identifying
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) as "apparently the first case to recognize a
cause of action based upon a discriminatory work environment").
Rogers involved a Hispanic complainant who alleged that her employer created an
offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic
clientele. 454 F.2d at 236. In Meritor, the Court cited Rogers and other lower court
decisions upholding Title VII harassment claims based on race and national origin as well as
sex, thereby endorsing the view that harassment in violation of Title VII may be based on
the plaintiff's race, national origin, or other protected status as well as sex. See Meritor,
477 U.S. at 65-66.
26. 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 46-8 (2d ed. 2002).
According to LARSON, supra, at 46-9, the first federal decision to uphold a Title VII claim
based on sexual harassment occurred in 1976 in Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), order vacated by 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 487 F.
Supp. 1387 (D.D.C 1980). Williams and other early cases are reviewed in Note, Sexual
Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an
Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1010-16 (1978). See generally CATHERUNE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
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Title VII. 27 Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit issued an influential
sexual harassment opinion in favor of the plaintiff in Henson v. Dundee,2"
which ultimately helped shape Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area
and also influenced early FHA harassment cases.29
Thus, by 1986 when the Supreme Court decided its first sexual
harassment case in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,3" a good deal of Title
VII law on this subject had already been written. Meritor was a case
brought by a bank employee who alleged that her branch manager made
unwelcome sexual advances toward her and that she engaged in a lengthy
sexual relationship with him out of fear of losing her job.3 The defendant
conceded that sexual harassment affecting the economic aspects of an
employee's job (i.e., quid pro quo harassment) violates Title VII, but it
argued that harassment leading to noneconomic injuries (i.e., hostile
environment harassment) should not be actionable.32 The Supreme Court
disagreed. Without dissent, the Court concluded that "a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." 33
The plaintiff's claim in Meritor was based on that part of Title VII
banning discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, '34 and the Court held that this provision is violated by
harassment that is shown to be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' 35 In applying this "severe or pervasive" standard, the
Meritor opinion determined that sexual advances are to be considered acts
of harassment if they are "unwelcome. ,36 In a final section of its opinion
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
28. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982), quoted with approval in Meritor, 477 U.S. at
66-67.
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67; HUD v. Krueger, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,119, at 26,023 (HUD ALI 1996) (FHA decision citing
Henson), aff'd, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997); HUD v. Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,100, at 25,900 (HUD ALI April 17, 1995) (same); Shellhammer v.
Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Prentice Hall) 15,472, at 135-36 (W.D. Ohio
1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
30. 477 U.S. 57.
31. Id. at 60.
32. See id. at 64.
33. Id. at 66.
34. See id. at 63 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
35. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (alteration in original).
36. Id. at 68. Thus, the Court held that the fact that the plaintiff in Meritor had
engaged in a "voluntary" sexual relationship with her harasser did not necessarily defeat her
claim if indeed this relationship was unwelcome. Id. In deciding the "unwelcomeness"
issue, the Court indicated that a variety of factors might be considered, including whether
the plaintiff spoke or dressed in a sexually provocative way and how she responded to her
supervisor's sexual suggestions. Id. at 68-69.
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in Meritor, the Court addressed the issue of whether the bank should be
"strictly liable" for its manager's harassment, advising that "courts
[should] look to agency principles for guidance in this area," but declining
to issue "a definitive rule on employer liability."
3 7
All of the Supreme Court's subsequent Title VII decisions dealing
with sexual harassment built on the foundation established by Meritor. For
example, in 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,38 the Court rejected a
defendant's argument that hostile environment claims could only succeed if
the challenged conduct "seriously affect[ed] plaintiff's psychological well-
being." 39  Such a requirement was seen as inconsistent with the basic
"severe or pervasive" standard of Meritor, which the Harris opinion
reaffirmed as controlling hostile environment claims under Title VII's
provision banning discriminatory "terms and conditions." 4" This standard
meant that "[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VI's
purview."41 On the other hand, determining whether specific conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable could not be made to
depend solely on whether the target of that conduct suffered psychological
harm, because this factor, though relevant, is only one of a myriad of
circumstances that must be considered.42 According to Harris, these
circumstances "may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.""
Finally, in 1998, the Court decided three more cases-Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 4 Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth,45 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton46-that built on its sexual
harassment jurisprudence. All three were prompted by claims under Title
37. Id. at 72. This was the opinion of five members of the Court. Justice
Marshall, speaking for the other four, argued for a strict liability standard, noting that
generally "the act of a supervisory employee or agent is imputed to the employer." Id. at
75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For subsequent developments concerning this issue, see infra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
38. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
39. Id. at 22 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
40. See id. at 21-22 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65).
41. Id. at 21.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id.
44. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
45. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
46. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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VII's "terms and conditions" provision,47 and all three reaffirmed the basic
"severe or pervasive" standard for hostile environment claims originally
established in Meritor.48 In particular, the Oncale opinion, which held that
same-sex harassment could be actionable, noted that Title VII's prohibition
of sexual harassment "forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to
alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment. "9
Burlington Industries and Faragher dealt with the circumstances under
which an employer would be held vicariously liable for its agent's
harassment, the issue left unresolved in Meritor.5 ° These decisions held
that such liability would automatically result in "quid pro quo" situations
where plaintiffs suffer some tangible employment action such as discharge
or demotion, 5' but that when no such tangible employment action is
involved (i.e., only a "hostile environment" claim is made), the defending
employer may escape liability by proving as an affirmative defense that it
had a reasonable anti-harassment policy which the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of.52
Thus, the Supreme Court's post-Meritor decisions, while fine-tuning
sexual harassment law under Title VII, continued to reaffirm its basic
principles. These principles may be summarized as follows: (1) that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination that may violate Title VII's
"terms and conditions" provision; (2) that a single incidence of quid pro
quo harassment is sufficient to violate the statute and render an employer
47. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78, 81; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher,
524 U.S. at 781.
48. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher,
524 U.S. at 786. For one of the Court's more recent endorsements of the "severe or
pervasive" standard, see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061,
2074 (2002) (racial discrimination).
49. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
50. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
51. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 760-63; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-92. As
the Court explained in the Burlington Industries opinion: "Tangible employment actions are
the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates. A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a
company act .... For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer." 524 U.S. at 762 (citations
omitted).
52. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 760-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
These opinions expressed some dissatisfaction with the "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment" labels, at least for purposes of determining an employer's vicarious liability,
preferring instead to distinguish the two categories of harassment cases on the basis of
whether a "tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's
sexual demands." Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 753. Because this change in terminology
does not appear to be significant in terms of the issue of whether particular conduct violates
Title VII (as opposed to whether an employer should be held liable for such conduct, see
Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 753), this Article continues to use the terms "quid pro quo"
and "hostile environment."
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vicariously liable; (3) that even harassment that does not result in tangible
employment actions may be unlawful; but (4) that such hostile environment
claims, which do not automatically result in vicarious liability, are
actionable only if the harasser's conduct is so "severe or pervasive" that it
alters the victim's conditions of employment.
The difficulty of meeting the "severe or pervasive" standard has
regularly been emphasized by the Supreme Court.13 In a recent statement
concerning this matter, the Court in Faragher, speaking through Justice
Souter, stated:
Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in
the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the
same sex and of the opposite sex." A recurring point in these
opinions is that "simple teasing," offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the "terms and conditions of
employment."
These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently
demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a "general
civility code." Properly applied, they will filter out complaints
attacking "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the
sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and
occasional teasing." We have made it clear that conduct must be
extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment, and the Courts of Appeals have heeded this view.54
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text and infra note 54 and accompanying
text.
54. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted). At the end of this passage, the
Faragher opinion cited with approval two appellate decisions that both dealt with fairly
serious harassing conduct: Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569 (2d
Cir. 1989), and Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986). In Carrero, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant's characterization of his conduct, which consisted of
several instances over a two-week period of stroking his female subordinate's arms and
knees and attempting to kiss her on the lips and neck, as "trivial" and "innocuous."
Instead, the court found that these "constant" unwelcome sexual advances pervasively
altered the plaintiff's working environment sufficiently to create a hostile environment. 890
F.2d at 577-78. In Moylan, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor repeatedly attempted to
kiss and fondle her, and eventually raped her in his office. 792 F.2d at 749. Soon
thereafter, she was fired for an unrelated and apparently legitimate reason. The district
court, viewing the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim solely as a quid pro quo claim,
dismissed it because the firing was warranted. Id. at 750. The Eighth Circuit held that the
plaintiff's allegations also supported a hostile environment claim and remanded to the
district court for a determination of this claim's merit. Id. at 750-52.
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2. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES UNDER THE FHA
The first reported FHA decision involving sexual harassment was in
the 1983 case Shellhammer v. Lewallen." The plaintiffs in Shellhammer
were a married couple who were evicted from their apartment allegedly
because Mrs. Shellhammer refused her landlord's requests to pose for nude
photographs and to have sex with him. 6 The initial problem was to
determine whether these allegations stated a claim under the FHA. Noting
the absence of any housing precedents, the magistrate to whom the case
had been assigned turned to employment decisions under Title VII. 57
These cases had established two distinct types of sexual harassment claims:
(1) "quid pro quo" claims where sexual favors were sought in exchange
for continued employment or other job benefits; and (2) "hostile
environment" claims where unwelcome sexual advances occurred but did
not lead to lost employment or other economic injuries."
The magistrate ruled that both types of claims were actionable under
the FHA. 9  Turning to the facts, he rejected the plaintiffs' hostile
environment claim on the ground that the landlord's two sexual requests
over a three-to-four month period did not amount to the "pervasive and
persistent" conduct necessary to establish this type of claim.60 On the other
hand, the quid pro quo claim, which did not require a showing of persistent
conduct, did succeed because the decision to evict the plaintiffs was found
to have been motivated by Mrs. Shellhammer's rejection of the defendant's
sexual advances.6 As a result, the magistrate concluded that the defendant
had discriminated against Mrs. Shellhammer "on the basis of her sex in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 62
55. 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Prentice Hall) 15,472.
56. Id. at 135.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 136.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 137. Although Shellhammer's precise articulation of this standard differs
somewhat from the "severe or pervasive" standard for hostile environment cases that the
Supreme Court ultimately chose for Title VII cases, see supra notes 35 and 40-43 and
accompanying text, and that subsequent fair housing decisions then adopted for FHA cases,
see cases cited infra note 64 para. 1, there is no reason to suppose that the magistrate's use
of a "pervasive and persistent" standard in Shellhammer resulted in a different decision than
he would have reached had he used the "severe or pervasive" standard.
61. Shellhammer, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Prentice Hall) at 137.
62. Id. at 139. The magistrate also ruled that Mr. Shellhammer was a proper
plaintiff, because he suffered a "distinct and palatable [sic] injury" as a result of the
landlord's actions against his wife. Id. (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 372 (1982) ("distinct and palpable injury")). However, the magistrate ruled that the
plaintiffs would not be permitted to prosecute the case as a class action on behalf of other
female tenants who were also allegedly subjected to sexual harassment by Mr. Lewallen.
Id. at 135. In a separate opinion, the Shellhammers were awarded $7,410 for their
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The Shelihammer opinion established the framework for all
subsequent sexual harassment decisions involving housing. Virtually all of
these decisions agreed with Shellhammer that it is appropriate to rely on
Title VII precedents in establishing the contours of sexual harassment law
under the FHA.63 All agreed that if the plaintiff's complaint involved not
the loss of a tangible housing benefit but rather only a "hostile
environment" claim, then liability requires that the defendant's behavior be
"severe or pervasive" enough to alter the terms and conditions of the
plaintiff's residency. 64 Also, to the extent that subsequent cases cited a
specific provision within the FHA that was violated by sexual harassment,
they, like Shelihammer, generally relied on § 3604(b)'s prohibition of
discriminatory "terms and conditions. 65 None ever mentioned § 3604(c)'s
ban on discriminatory statements as a basis for a harasser's possible
liability under the FHA.66
individual claims. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed the magistrate's rejection of their class
action and hostile environment claims, but the Sixth Circuit, in an unreported opinion,
affirmed these rulings. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. 84-3573, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir.
July 31, 1985) (per curiam).
63. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1007-08, 1010; Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt.,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 494-97 (D. Md. 1996); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393,
1397-98 (C.D. Cal. 1995); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d
1085, 1088-90, 1092 (10th Cir. 1993)); infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing
Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P'ship, No. 99-17122, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5718 (9th Cir.
March 28, 2001)); cf. Gnerre v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d. 84,
87-88 (Mass. 1988) (interpreting state fair housing law).
64. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008; Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 496-98;
Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1398; infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing Honce, 1
F.3d at 1090); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing Hall, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5718 at *4 (holdihg that harassment that "occurred only occasionally and was
not severe" is not actionable); Abrams, 694 F. Supp. at 1104 (employing a "severe and
pervasive" standard) (emphasis added)).
If loss of a tangible housing benefit is involved (i.e., a quid pro quo case), FHA
decisions, like those under Title VII, require only a single incident of harassment. See,
e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997); Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,900.
65. See, e.g., Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1396-98; Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp.
835, 840-41 (N.D. 11. 1988); infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Honce, 1
F.3d at 1088-90, 1092); see also Krueger, 115 F.3d at 491-92 (finding violations of §
3604(b) and § 3617); DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1006 (citing § 3604(b) and § 3617); Williams,
955 F. Supp. at 491, 494-96 (citing § 3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3617); Kogut, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,904 (finding violations of § 3604(a), §
3604(b), and § 3617); cf. Gnerre, 524 N.E.2d. at 87 (finding violation of state fair housing
law's equivalent of § 3604(b)).
66. See cases cited supra note 65.
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3. APPELLATE DECISIONS REJECTING HOSTILE HOUSING ENVIRONMENT
CLAIMS
One result of the fact that courts deciding sexual harassment cases
under the FHA have strictly followed Title VII law is that hostile
environment claims have been defeated in cases where the challenged
behavior did not reach the level of "severe or pervasive" harassment.
Indeed, all three of the federal appellate decisions involving hostile
environment harassment in housing have ruled for the defendants on the
ground that their conduct, though inappropriate, was not shown to have
met this "severe or pervasive" standard.
The first FHA case involving sexual harassment to produce a decision
on the merits by a federal court of appeals was Honce v. Vigil, 7 where, in
1993, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendant
in a case containing both quid pro quo and hostile environment claims.
The plaintiff in Honce was a single mother who was in the process of
moving her mobile home into the defendant's trailer park when he asked
her out socially on three different occasions. 8 After she had moved in and
made clear to him that she did not want to go out with him, a series of
disputes arose between them, which resulted in his threatening to evict her
and her ultimate decision to move out.69 In reviewing her FHA claims, all
three judges on the panel focused exclusively on § 3604(b) and agreed that
Title VII precedents should guide their interpretation of this provision. 0
In response to the plaintiff's quid pro quo claim, the majority held that she
failed to show the necessary causal connection between the defendant's
interference with her tenancy and her rejection of his advances.7 As to
her hostile environment claim, the court relied on Meritor and other Title
VII decisions in holding that such a claim cannot be based on isolated or
casual examples of discriminatory conduct, but rather requires behavior
that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
housing arrangement."72 This meant, according to the Honce majority,
that '[h]ostile environment claims usually involve a long-lasting pattern of
67. 1 F.3d 1085. The Sixth Circuit's unpublished decision in the Shellhammer
case some eight years before had dealt only with procedural matters. See supra note 62.
Another purely procedural decision handed down at about the same time as Honce was
United States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd., 4 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1086-87.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1088-90, 1092.
71. Id. at 1088-89. In dissent, Judge Seymour opined that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant "conditioned the
quality of her home environment upon her positive response to his personal overtures ...
[and] that Mr. Vigil's conduct, culminating in his eviction threat, was in retaliation for her
refusal of his invitations." Id. at 1093-94.
72. Id. at 1090 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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highly offensive behavior."73 Believing that the defendant's "offensive
behavior here did not include sexual remarks or requests, physical
touching, or threats of violence," but only a series of requests to go out
with him socially, the majority held that the "severe or pervasive" standard
was not met.74
Three years after Honce, the Seventh Circuit in DiCenso v. Cisneros75
ruled in favor of a landlord who had been held liable for hostile
environment harassment in a Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) administrative proceeding. The landlord in DiCenso,
in the course of collecting rent from a female tenant, caressed her arm and
back; told her that, if she could not pay the rent, she could take care of it
in other ways; and, when she slammed the door in his face, stood outside
her apartment calling her names, including "bitch" and "whore."76 Based
on these facts, HUD brought a charge alleging violations of § 3604(b) and
§ 3617, but the HUD administrative law judge initially ruled for the
landlord, holding that his conduct was not severe enough to be actionable
under the hostile environment theory and finding that the facts did not
support a quid pro quo claim because a subsequent eviction proceeding was
prompted not by the tenant's rejection of the landlord's sexual advances but
by her refusal to pay the rent.77 An appeal was taken to the HUD
Secretary, who reversed as to the hostile environment claim, holding that
the single incident here was "sufficiently severe as to constitute invidious
sexual harassment" and therefore violated § 3604(b) and § 3617.78 The
case was remanded for a determination of relief by the HUD ALJ, who
awarded the tenant $5,000 for her emotional distress, assessed a civil
penalty of $5,000 against the landlord, and entered injunctive relief.79
73. Id.
74. Id. In dissent, Judge Seymour took "issue with the majority's assertion that
the Mr. Vigil's offensive behavior did not include 'threats of violence"' and noted that
"[the] evidence indicates that numerous women ... had felt compelled to move out as a
result of Mr. Vigil's behavior or had been evicted by him." Id. at 1095 (Seymour, J.,
dissenting). Judge Seymour concluded that sufficient evidence was presented to support a
hostile environment claim. Id. at 1094-96. Although Judge Seymour was "particularly
troubled by the majority's treatment of Ms. Honce's [hostile environment] claim," her
dissent was based on a different view of the record than the majority's, rather than a
disagreement with them over the propriety of applying Title VII precedent to hostile
environment claims based on § 3604(b). See id. at 1094-95 (citing Title VII precedents as
controlling this claim).
75. 96 F.3d 1004.
76. Id. at 1006.
77. 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,098, at 25,885-86 (HUD
ALJ March 20, 1995).
78. 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,101, at 25,912 (HUD
Secretary April 18, 1995).
79. 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,108, at 25,951-52 (HUD
ALJ June 19, 1995).
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The landlord appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which held in a 2-1
decision that, based on Title VII law, his behavior was not "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment."80 According to the majority
opinion in DiCenso: "the problem with [the female tenant's] complaint is
that although DiCenso may have harassed her, he did so only once.
Moreover, DiCenso's conduct, while clearly unwelcome, was much less
offensive than other incidents which have not violated Title VII." 8
The DiCenso majority recognized that a single incident of harassment,
if severe enough, could be sufficient to support a hostile environment claim
and conceded that the landlord's behavior here included a comment that
"vaguely invited [the tenant] to exchange sex for rent."82 Nevertheless, it
concluded, based on "the totality of circumstances," that DiCenso's
conduct was "not sufficiently egregious to create an objectively hostile
housing environment" because "he did not touch an intimate body part,
and did not threaten [the tenant] with any physical harm."'83
Finally, in 2001 in Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. Partnership, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a district court's entry of summary judgment against a
plaintiff-tenant who had alleged a variety of FHA violations by his
apartment manager, including sexual harassment based on the manager's
"gender-based remarks and conduct."84 In an unpublished opinion, the
appellate court announced that it would be "guided by interpretations of
Title VII" and determined that liability under the FHA was not appropriate
because "the conduct at issue occurred only occasionally and was not
80. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
81. Id. at 1008-09. In dissent, Judge Flaum conceded that "the majority may very
well be correct in stating that DiCenso's conduct would not be sufficient to give rise to a
claim for sexual harassment under our Title VII precedent," but concluded nevertheless that
it was appropriate to uphold HUD's determination that this conduct violated the FHA under
the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation
of a statute it has been entrusted to administer. Id. at 1009-10 (Flaum, J., dissenting)
(relying on Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
For one of the Supreme Court's more recent statements about the judicial deference that is
owed to an agency's decision in this context, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001).
82. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1009. The majority failed to address the impact of what
the dissent described as Mr. DiCenso's "hurling of gender-oriented epithets" after the
plaintiff rejected his offer. Id. at 1010 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1009. After the Seventh Circuit's decision, the HUD ALJ made an
award of attorneys' fees to the landlord based on a finding that HUD's litigation position
was not "substantially justified" after the ALJ's initial decision finding that DiCenso had
engaged in only one "non-severe" incident of harassment. See 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,131, at 26,098-102 (HUD ALJ June 26, 1997).
84. Hall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5718 at *3. The opinion contains no further
description of the remarks and conduct at issue.
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severe."s 5 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, "[w]hile the [manager's]
conduct arguably may have been crude or inappropriate, it did not rise to
the level of actionable sexual harassment."86
C. Critiques of FHA "No Liability" Decisions Based on Title VII
The implicit message of the appellate court decisions described in the
previous Section is that a landlord may subject his female tenants to sexual
harassment, so long as that harassment does not result in the loss of
tangible housing benefits and is not so egregious or frequent as to meet the
"severe or pervasive" standard. This result has been criticized by a
number of commentators. s7 The Seventh Circuit's decision in DiCenso is
seen as particularly troubling. 88 While the majority opinion in DiCenso
stressed that it did not condone the landlord's conduct and cautioned that it
"should not be read as giving landlords one free chance to harass their
tenants,"89 it seemed to do just that, at least if the landlord's "one free
chance" does not involve "touch[ing] an intimate body part [or]
threaten[ing the tenant] with [] physical harm." 90
Commentators who have criticized DiCenso and other FHA hostile
environment cases argue not that these decisions have misread Title VII
precedents, but that their reliance on Title VII is inappropriate in FHA
cases because the housing context makes sexual harassment there worse
than in the workplace.9" The gist of this argument is that one's home should
be a special place of privacy and sanctuary and should be more protected
from an outsider's unwelcome intrusions than less sacrosanct locales such
as the workplace. In addition, a harassing landlord is seen as more
threatening than a job supervisor, both because a landlord has virtually
unlimited access to his potential victims at any time and because the
unequal power relationship that is inherent in harassment cases is generally
more pronounced in a landlord-tenant situation than in an employment
setting. This latter consideration is underscored by the fact that most
reported cases of sexual harassment in housing have involved low-income
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 4, at 44-55; Lindemyer, supra note 4, at 383-86;
Carlotta J. Roos, Note, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for Recognizing the Sanctity of
the Home in Housing Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1131, 1139-46
(1998).
88. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
89. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1009.
90. Id.
91. See Adams, supra note 4, at 21-28, 44-48; Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection
of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title
VIII: Who Is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 885-88 (1997); Lindemyer,
supra note 4, at 352-53, 368-78; Roos, supra note 87, at 1139-46.
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women whose need for the housing controlled by their harasser is even
more desperate than their counterparts' need for a job in most workplace
harassment cases.92
The view that harassment in housing may be more detrimental than in
the workplace actually dates back to the early days of FHA harassment
decisions. In an oft-quoted passage in the first major law review article on
housing harassment in 1987, Regina Cahan pointed out that:
When sexual harassment occurs at work, at that moment or at the
end of the workday, the woman may remove herself from the
offensive environment. She will choose whether to resign from
her position based on economic and personal considerations. In
contrast, when the harassment occurs in a woman's home, it is a
complete invasion in her life. Ideally, home is the haven from
92. See Cahan, supra note 3, at 1067 (98% of housing harassment victims
identified by survey had annual incomes of less than $20,000, and 75 % had annual incomes
of under $10,000). This trend is borne out by cases and articles on the subject. See
Krueger, 115 F.3d at 489 (noting that defendant landlord knew that victim's Section Eight
voucher was not enough to pay the monthly rent, but he rented to her anyway, pressuring
her to have sex with him in order to make up for the shortfall); Honce, 1 F.3d at 1094
(Seymour, J., dissenting) (noting that plaintiff was "a single mother of a young child" who
"was in severe financial straits"); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (describing sexual harassment victims as residents of a homeless shelter); Nancy
Blodgett, Lusting Landlords: More Women Tenants Suing, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 30
(noting that the "most frequent targets [of harassment] are impoverished single [] women in
a tight housing market"); Annette Fuentes & Madelyn Miller, Unreasonable Access: Sexual
Harassment Comes Home, CITY LIMITS, June/July 1986, at 16, 18 (describing a landlord
who rented primarily to women receiving public assistance so that he could request sex in
lieu of rent); Official Accused of Harassment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 27, 1994, at
D22 (describing suit against housing official who had allegedly made sexual advances to
women applying for Section Eight housing).
Commentators have also discussed the link between low socioeconomic status of
tenants and housing harassment by landlords. See, e.g., Robert Rosenthal, Comment,
Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 589, 590-93 (1992).
Rosenthal argues that socioeconomic conditions in urban areas during the 1970s and 1980s,
including a decline in affordable housing options and a growing number of female-headed
households receiving welfare, led directly to the problem of landlord sexual harassment.
See id. at 590-92. Similarly, in Adams, supra note 4, at 30-38, Professor Michelle Adams
discusses the interplay between gender, poverty, race, and single-parenthood that
disproportionately consigns low-income, minority, female heads of households to rental
housing, where they are more vulnerable to harassment from landlords and property
managers than if they owned their homes. Furthermore, Adams points out, the very
precariousness of many of these women's situations-the difficulty of finding affordable
housing, their reliance on housing subsidies-is a factor that landlords may seek to exploit.
Id. at 65-68. See also Zalesne, supra note 91, at 882-84 (describing the "power matrix
between a landlord and tenant" as a function of gender, race, socioeconomic class, and
scarcity of housing).
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the troubles of the day. When home is not a safe place, a woman
may feel distressed and, often, immobile.93
Understanding the home as a uniquely protected place has led
commentators to conclude that harassing conduct should be held to violate
the FHA even if it would not be egregious enough to be actionable under
Title VII. Thus, for example, Professor Zalesne has argued that landlords
should be held "to a heightened standard where they have significant
power over their tenants."94 Similarly, Professor Adams has advocated
that, because "[s]exual harassment at home must be recognized and
understood as a distinct and significant civil rights issue," 95 a housing
provider's harassing activities should be evaluated based on "the nature
and importance of home in the American cultural imagination," which
would likely change the result in favor of liability in many FHA cases. 96
The view that sexual harassment in housing might be more damaging
to its victims than workplace harassment finds some support in the cases.
For example, in Beliveau v. Caras, a district court supported its conclusion
that principles of sexual harassment law derived from Title VII should
apply "as strongly in the housing situation as in the workplace" 9' by
quoting Regina Cahan's statement set forth above. 9 Subsequently, two
other trial court decisions-Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc.99 and
Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass 'n"'°-cited this part
of the Beliveau opinion with approval, with one opinion noting that "[a]t
least one court has recognized that sexual harassment in the home may
have more severe effects than harassment in the workplace."'°
While all three of these decisions upheld the plaintiffs' sexual
harassment claims under the FHA, each did so on the basis of familiar
Title VII standards. In Beliveau, for example, the defendant-landlord was
accused of making several unwelcome sexual remarks and one incident of
offensive touching, which the court concluded met the "severe or
pervasive" standard applicable to Title VII hostile environment claims."0 2
93. Cahan, supra note 3, at 1073.
94. Zalesne, supra note 91, at 893.
95. Adams, supra note 4, at 71.
96. Id. at 62. See also Lindemyer, supra note 4, at 368 ("The expectation of both
safety and privacy in one's home is justifiably greater than that in the workplace, and thus a
higher standard of conduct is warranted."). See generally Roos, supra note 87.
97. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397.
98. Id. at 1397 n.I (quoting Cahan, supra note 3, at 1073).
99. * Williams, 955 F. Supp. 490.
100. 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 16,250, at 16,250.5 (D.D.C.
Dec. 18, 1997) (citing Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397 n.1).
101. Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 498 (citing Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397 n. 1); see
also Reeves, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16,250.5.
102. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1398.
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Similarly egregious behaviors were involved in Williams and Reeves."°3
Thus, though the courts recognized the possibility that harassment in
housing might be worse than in the workplace, this was not a necessary
element of their decisions, nor was it offered to justify adoption of a
different standard for FHA cases than exists under Title VII.
Indeed, the argument for interpreting FHA's "terms and conditions"
provision more rigorously than Title VII's analog is ultimately
unpersuasive. The basic premise of this argument-that one's home should
receive more protection than one's workplace-may well be sound, but the
argument is essentially one of policy, and therefore more properly directed
to Congress as the author of the laws involved rather than to the courts
who are merely charged with interpreting these laws. The fact remains
that Congress, by adopting the identical "terms and conditions" language
in the FHA's § 3604(b) that it employed in Title VII's comparable
provision four years earlier, 0 4 chose to outlaw only those types of housing
practices in § 3604(b) that it banned in the employment sphere under Title
VII's "terms and conditions" provision. Given this congressional decision
and the consistent determination by the Supreme Court that a "terms and
conditions" violation of Title VII occurs in the hostile environment context
only if the harasser's behavior is "severe or pervasive," lower courts really
have no choice but to apply a similar standard to FHA claims based on §
3604(b). The result may be unfortunate-for purposes of Title VII, as well
as the FHA-but as long as Congress sees fit to accept the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the meaning of Title VII's "terms and conditions"
provision in harassment cases, that interpretation will control § 3604(b)
claims as well.
There is, however, a way out of this Title VII-imposed limitation on
housing harassment cases, but it is to look to language in the FHA's
prohibitions that is different from, not similar to, Title VII's language.
Specifically, the FHA has two substantive provisions-§ 3604(c) and §
3617-where the language is not only significantly broader than their Title
VII counterparts, but may be applicable to harassment situations.
103. See Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 491-93, 496-98 (holding that two incidents of
sexual assault followed by continued verbal harassment over a three-and-a-half-month
period, which included calling plaintiff a "bitch" and other derogatory names, satisfied the
"severe or pervasive" standard for hostile environment claims under Title VII); Reeves, 3
Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16.250.1-16.250.2, 16.250.5-16.250.6
(holding repeated racial and sexist epithets, including physically intimidating plaintiff by
threatening to rape and kill her on numerous occasions over a period of many years,
satisfied the "severe or pervasive" standard for hostile environment claims under Title VII).
104. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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D. The FHA's Broader Language in § 3604(c) and § 3617
Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful:
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
105
The language of this provision is in many respects similar to a provision in
Title VII that makes it unlawful for an employer "to print or publish or
cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer . . . indicating any preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race [or other
prohibited factors]."' 6 The operative language of these provisions is
virtually identical with one major exception,'0 7 which is that § 3604(c) goes
beyond its Title VII counterpart by banning discriminatory "statements" as
well as discriminatory "notices" and "advertisements." By extending its
prohibitions to discriminatory statements, § 3604(c) provides a source of
law that would seem to cover most types of verbal harassment that are in
no way addressed by Title VII.
This broad coverage could prove significant for housing harassment
cases. Survey data indicate that speech-based harassment is present in
virtually all sexual harassment cases. 8 Even more significantly, in a large
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
106. Id. § 2000e-3(b).
107. Besides the difference discussed in the text, other differences between these
two provisions do exist, such as Title VII's inclusion of an exception for a "bona fide
occupational qualification"; Title VII's addition of the word "specification" along with
"preference, limitation, or discrimination" in the list of prohibited types of communications;
the FHA's inclusion of "familial status" and "handicap" as additional bases of prohibited
discrimination; and the FHA's addition of a provision also making it unlawful for such
communications to indicate "an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination." However, with the exception of the last item, see infra text accompanying
notes 180-87, none of these differences are significant with respect to the coverage issues
that are at the heart of this Article.
108. See Cahan, supra note 3, at 1070. Among survey respondents who reported
being sexually harassed, 71.7 % received requests for sexual intercourse, sexual exposure, or
to pose for nude pictures, and 38.8% were subjected to abusive remarks. In contrast,
conduct-based harassment-unwanted touching or indecent exposure-was only present in
35.4% of cases. See id. The numbers total higher than 100% because some respondents
reported more than one type of harassing activity. See id.
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number of cases the only type of harassment is verbal. 9 Still, despite the
apparent applicability of § 3604(c) to housing harassment cases, few
litigants have asserted claims under this provision,"' and none of the
commentators who have argued in favor of a more generous standard for
FHA harassment claims than Title VII's have mentioned § 3604(c)."'
The other FHA provision that might be helpful in addressing housing
harassment is § 3617, which makes it unlawful:
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of,
any right granted or protected by section 803, 804, 805, or 806
[42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606].12
This provision also has a counterpart in Title VII, which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual employee
"because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
109. See id. at 1072 (noting that requests for sexual intercourse occurred
independent of any other type of harassment 52.4% of the time, and abusive remarks
occurred independently 33.3% of the time). Of course, purely speech-based harassment
may be sufficient to violate § 3604(b), but, as decisions such as DiCenso show, it may be
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that speech-based harassment alone is "severe or pervasive"
enough to be actionable under that part of the statute. See supra Part I.B.3.
110. The only reported sexual harassment decisions in which § 3604(c) claims were
discussed appear to be Walker v. Crawford, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.)
16,461, at 16,461.1-1.6 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2000) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of
some plaintiffs and against others in a case that included claims under §§ 3604(a), 3604(c),
3617, and various state law theories), and Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1174-75 (denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss a sexual harassment complaint that included claims under §§
3604(a), 3604(b), 3604(c), 3617, and state law). See also Hall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
5718 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's complaint which included a § 3604(c) claim for
disability discrimination and allegations of sexual harassment that did not refer to §
3604(c)). In none of these cases were the § 3604(c) claims of independent significance; that
is, they neither supported a liability theory nor additional relief based on standards different
from the plaintiffs' other FHA claims.
A § 3604(c) claim was asserted in one racial harassment case by a tenant of Lebanese
descent who alleged that his apartment complex's managers subjected him to repeated slurs,
threats, and insults due to his national origin. Texas v. Crest Asset Mgmt., Inc., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 722 (S.D. Tex. 2000). The court upheld many of the plaintiffs' claims but granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the § 3604(c) claim without providing any detailed
justification for this decision. Id. at 732.
111. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 4; Lindemyer, supra note 4; Roos, supra note
87. In her seminal article, which introduced and outlined the cause of action for housing
harassment, Cahan analyzed the portions of the FHA which she believed could be used to
litigate housing harassment cases. Section 3604(c) was not one of them. See Cahan, supra
note 3, at 1087-88.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
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practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under
this title."" 3 Here again, the language of the FHA's provision is clearly
broader. Title VII's prohibition is limited to retaliation against an
individual for his opposition to practices condemned by the statute.
Section 3617 not only covers retaliation," 4 but bans other types of
discriminatory behavior as well.
By its terms, § 3617 prohibits a wide variety of practices, including
coercion, intimidation, threats, and-most importantly for present
purposes-" interfere[nce] with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of.
• .any right granted or protected by" §§ 3603-3606."' Certainly, sexual
harassment could be characterized as a form of "interference" with a
female tenant's right to nondiscriminatory treatment, 16 and some litigants
113. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
114. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1126-31 (9th Cir.
2001); Krueger, 115 F.3d at 490-92; Texas, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 732-34; Congdon v. Strine,
854 F. Supp. 355, 363-64 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
116, 117-18, 123 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 24
C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5) (2002) (HUD regulation interpreting § 3617 to prohibit
"[r]etaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair Housing Act").
Retaliation in violation of § 3617 may occur in the context of a sexual harassment
case. For example, a landlord was held to have violated § 3617 by, inter alia, initiating
eviction proceedings against a female tenant in response to her having filed a fair housing
complaint based on his harassing behavior toward her. Krueger, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,026. In such a situation, however, the § 3617 violation is
based not on the landlord's sexual harassment but instead on his taking an adverse action
against the tenant (e.g., eviction) in response to the latter's having filed an FHA complaint.
Id. See also Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,895, 25,904-05
(finding § 3617 retaliation claim failed in case involving sexual harassment because the
evidence did not show that defendants were aware of complainant's intention to file FHA
complaint when they evicted her).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. For a discussion of the meaning of the words "coerce,"
"intimidate," "threaten," and "interfere" in § 3617, see Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128-29.
116. See cases cited infra note 120. In addition to this direct type of § 3617 claim,
a victim of sexual harassment could conceivably sue under § 3617 because the defendant
harassed her "on account of [her] having exercised or enjoyed ... any right granted or
protected" by §§ 3603-3606. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. This type of § 3617 claim, however,
would not only be subject to the potential difficulties of a direct claim that are discussed in
the subsequent two paragraphs of the text, but also to the potential additional defense that
the landlord's offending behavior was prompted by the victim's sex and not "on account of"
her exercise of her §§ 3603-3606 rights. See, e.g., Walker, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16,461.4 (finding that sexual harassment claim based on § 3617 fails
even though landlord was shown to have coerced and intimidated female tenant, because
"the intimidation and coercion was not 'on account of [her] having exercised or enjoyed'
any Fair Housing right"); see also infra Part II.A.4 (arguing that a landlord's sexual
harassment is typically "because of sex"). But see Grieger, 689 F. Supp. at 840-41 (noting
that § 3617 would be violated if landlord, after his sexual harassment of female tenant,
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have cited § 3617 along with other FHA provisions in their housing
harassment complaints."1
There are, however, some potential difficulties in using § 3617 as an
independent source of law to challenge housing harassment. First, some
courts have held that the term "interfere" in § 3617-coming as it does
after the w6rds "coerce, intimidate, [and] threaten"-should be interpreted
to require a certain level of force, ' 8 which might mean that the type of
offensive and unwelcome, albeit non-threatening, comments that often
form the basis for hostile environment claims would not be actionable
under § 3617. Other courts, however, have given a more generous
interpretation to this term," 9 and at least two decisions have held that
sexual harassment may sufficiently "interfere" with a female tenant's
enjoyment of her apartment to establish a § 3617 violation. 20 In both of
intimidated, threatened, or interfered with her "because of [her] refusal to succumb to [his]
sexual demands") (emphasis added).
117. See Krueger, 115 F.3d at 491; DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1006; Walker, 3 Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16,461.1-.2, 16,461.4; Reeves, 3 Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16,250.5 n.7; Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 491; Woods,
884 F. Supp. at 1175; Abrams, 694 F. Supp. at 1102; Grieger, 689 F. Supp. at 836, 840-
41; Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,895, 25,904-05.
118. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n,
208 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903-05 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that various non-violent actions
directed against plaintiffs by officials of their homeowners' association are not sufficiently
severe "to implicate[] concerns expressed by Congress in" § 3617); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1090, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that § 3617 claim based on defendants'
interference with plaintiffs' enjoyment of their home can succeed only if defendants' conduct
was intended to drive plaintiffs out of their home); Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton,
68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that impermissible interference under
§ 3617 "must be more than peaceable opposition through legal channels"); Salisbury House,
Inc. v. McDermott, No. CIV.A. 96-CV-6486, 1998 WL 195693, at *12 (E.D. Pa. March
24, 1998) (holding that "some type of force or compulsion" is required for a violation of §
3617); see also Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361, 365 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that incidents
amounting to "no more than minimal friction between a landlord and tenants" are
insufficient to make out a harassment claim under the FHA); Mich. Prot. and Advocacy
Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the view that "any action
whatsoever that in any way hinders a member of a protected class" in exercising fair
housing rights constitutes a violation of § 3617).
119. See, e.g., Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128-29; United States v. City of Hayward,
California, 36 F.3d 832, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1994); Babin, 18 F.3d at 347; Fowlerv. Borough
of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613-14 (D.N.J. 2000); Texas, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 732-33;
People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992);
People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1135-36 (E.D. Va.
1992). According to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Walker, "interference" for purposes of
§ 3617 simply means "the act of meddling in or hampering an activity or process." 272
F.3d at 1129 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1178 (14th ed.
1961)).
120. Krueger, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,026 (holding
that landlord's sexual harassment of female tenant interfered with the "quiet enjoyment of
her apartment" in violation of § 3617); Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. &
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these cases, however, the defendant's harassment was severe; indeed, it
amounted to quid pro quo harassment in violation of the complainant's
rights under § 3604(b), 2 ' which meant that it was sufficiently egregious to
satisfy even the restrictive Title VII standards.
A second potential stumbling block in using § 3617 to challenge
sexual harassment arises from the concluding part of this provision, which
requires that the interference be with a person's exercise or enjoyment of a
right "granted or protected by" §§ 3603-3606. In order to assert a § 3617
claim, therefore, a victim of harassment would have to assert a right
covered by these other substantive provisions. As explained by the Second
Circuit, § 3617 "prohibits the interference with the exercise of Fair
Housing rights only as enumerated in these referenced sections [3603-
3606]. "122 While this does not mean that a § 3617 claim always requires
an outright violation of §§ 3603-3606, there must at least be some sort of
connection to a right covered by these other substantive provisions. 23 The
problem is that if the "predicate" right in a § 3617 harassment case is
Bus.) at 25,895, 25,904-05 (holding that landlord's eviction of tenant who refused his sexual
advances sufficiently interfered with tenant's "right to quiet enjoyment of her apartment" to
establish § 3617 violation).
121. Krueger, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,022-26;
Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,900-04.
122. Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994).
123. See, e.g., City of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 836; Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162,
1164 (9th Cir. 1975); Egan, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93; Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty
Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 240-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp.
1555, 1562 (D. Kan. 1992); Abrams, 694 F. Supp. at 1103-04 (citing Stackhouse v.
DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210-11 (N.D. III. 1985)). But see Halprin, 208 F. Supp. 2d at
903-05 (suggesting that, in the Seventh Circuit, it is doubtful that § 3617 could support a
claim based on conduct that would not also violate one of the FHA's other substantive
provisions).
For example, § 3617 prohibits interference against a person "on account of his having
aided or encouraged any other person" in the exercise of §§ 3603-3606 rights, a provision
that protects a variety of housing "helpers" (e.g., an apartment manager who is fired for
renting to a minority tenant) even if the protected-class member involved is successful in
exercising her fair housing rights. See, e.g., Walker, 272 F.3d at 1126-31; see also
Grieger, 689 F. Supp. at 840 (upholding § 3617 claim by husband of target of landlord's
sexual demands where husband was thereafter threatened by landlord for "encouraging" his
wife to refuse those demands). Section 3617 may also be invoked by protected-class
members against non-housing providers who interfere with their §§ 3603-3606 rights (e.g.,
claims against neighbors who interfere with minority plaintiffs' housing rights in order to
drive them out of the neighborhood). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Smith v. Hobbs, 44 F.
Supp. 2d 788, 789-90 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211 & n.6; HUD v. Gutleben, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,078, at 25,726-28 (HUD ALJ Aug. 15, 1994) (holding
that neighbor violated § 3617 by directing racial epithets at tenant's children); HUD v.
Weber, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,041, at 25,424 (HUD ALJ
Feb. 18, 1993) (holding that neighbor's verbal harassment of Hmong who was inspecting
house next door as a prospective tenant violates § 3617).
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based on § 3604(a)'s ban on discriminatory refusals to deal or on §
3604(b)'s guarantee of nondiscrimination in "terms or conditions," then
the fact that these provisions are subject to the restrictive Title VII
standards in sexual harassment cases'24 may mean that § 3617 cannot be
used without reference to these standards. Of course, the predicate right
could be based on § 3604(c), but that would simply shift the analysis of a §
3617 claim back to § 3604(c), thereby raising again the question of the
latter provision's applicability to the situation.
Whatever the reason, § 3617 has not proved to be an independently
useful source of law in this field. Practically every housing harassment
case in which a § 3617 claim has been raised has also included claims
under § 3604(a) and/or § 3604(b), 2 5 and every court that has considered
such a case has employed the exact same Title VII standards that would
have been appropriate even in the absence of the § 3617 claim.'26
Therefore, the FHA's only provision that provides a clear source of
liability in harassment situations that do not violate Title VII's rigorous
standards would seem to be § 3604(c). For this reason, § 3604(c) is the
focus of the remainder of this Article.
124. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 64 and Part I.B.3.
125. See infra note 126.
126. DiCenso, 96 F.3d 1004, 1006, at 1008-09; Reeves, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) at 16,250.5-.6; Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 491, 494-96; Abrams, 694 F.
Supp. at 1102, 1104; see also Krueger, 115 F.3d at 491-92 (affirming decision against
landlord under both § 3604(b) and § 3617); Walker, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L.
& Bus.) at 16,461.1-.6 (upholding jury verdicts against landlord based on both § 3604 and §
3617); Grieger, 689 F. Supp. at 840-41 (avoiding decision on § 3617 claim in light of the
adequacy of § 3604(b) claim and upholding § 3617 claim for post-harassment interference);
Kogut, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,900 (finding that apartment
manager's eviction of a female tenant who rejected his advances violated §§ 3604(a),
3604(b) and 3617). But see Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1175 (suggesting that sexual harassment
claim against non-profit homeless shelter may be more appropriate under § 3617 than §
3604(a) because the former provision "is not limited to acts of 'sale' or 'rental"').
Some early decisions relied on § 3617 independently of claims under § 3604, because
the latter were subject to a more restrictive statute of limitations. See, e.g., Abrams, 694 F.
Supp. at 1102-04; see also Grieger, 689 F. Supp. at 836-37 (holding that statute of
limitations decision concerning plaintiffs' §§ 3603-3606 claims not applicable to their § 3617
claim). As a result of the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act, however, § 3617 claims
were brought under the same enforcement provisions as other FHA claims, which means
that this reason for treating § 3617 claims separately is no longer relevant. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 24, § 20:1 nn.9-16 and accompanying text. Even in these pre-1988 cases,
however, the courts never suggested that a § 3617 claim based on sexual harassment should
be decided by different substantive standards than those that applied to § 3604(a) and/or §
3604(b).
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II. § 3604(c)'s APPLICABILITY TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Elements of a § 3604(c) Violation
1. OVERVIEW
A violation of § 3604(c) requires a showing of five elements: that a
potential defendant (1) "make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published" (2) "any notice, statement, or advertisement" (3)
"with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling" (4) "that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination ... or any intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination" (5) "based on ... sex" or
some other factor made illegal by the FHA.'27 An analysis of each of
these elements is necessary to determine if § 3604(c) may provide an
independent basis for challenging housing harassment.
The first two elements of § 3604(c) would be present in virtually all
harassment cases, which invariably involve a landlord or other housing
agent '2 "mak[ing]" a "statement" to a current or prospective tenant. 29 It
is clear that the word "statement" in § 3604(c) covers oral as well as
127. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Unlike Title VII, which by its terms applies only to
"employers" and certain other identified entities, see id. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, the FHA
simply declares certain practices, such as those identified in § 3604(c), to be unlawful
without "limit[ing] or defin[ing] who can be sued for discriminatory housing practices,"
thereby implying that any person or entity that engages in such practices would be a proper
defendant under the statute. See Holley v. Crank, 258 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002).
128. Although we often use "landlord" in the remainder of this Article to refer to a
potential defendant in a § 3604(c) suit, it should be noted that this law bans discriminatory
statements made by all persons-not just landlords-who are engaged in housing sales and
rental activity, including apartment managers, other agents and employees of a landlord,
condominium and cooperative board members, realtors, and the like. See cases cited in
Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the
Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 266 nn.365-68
(2001). In particular, sexual harassment cases often involve statements by a landlord's agent.
For purposes of the Fair Housing Act, an agent "includes any person authorized to perform
an action on behalf of another person regarding any matter related to the sale or rental of
dwellings, including offers, solicitations or contracts and the administration of matters
regarding such offers, solicitations or contracts or any residential real estate-related
transactions." 24 C.F.R. § 100.20 (2002). See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1054
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that tenant who collected rent and showed apartments for owners but
did not receive compensation was an agent of the owners, and therefore her statements could
violate § 3604(c) and make owners liable therefor). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 24,
§ 12:10.
129. See, e.g., Krueger, 115 F.3d 487; DiCenso, 96 F.3d 1004; Williams, 955 F.
Supp. 490; Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. 1393; Walker, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. &
Bus.) 16,461; Grieger, 689 F. Supp. 835.
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written communications,' and that a single offending statement is
sufficient to violate this provision."'3 The third, fourth, and fifth elements
of a § 3604(c) violation, however, raise some serious issues of coverage,
which are discussed, respectively, in the next three Sections.
2. THE "WITH RESPECT TO THE SALE OR RENTAL" ELEMENT
The fact that § 3604(c) extends only to discriminatory statements made
"with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling" provides some significant
limitations on this provision's coverage. First, this phrase means that
coverage is limited to statements made by persons who are, at the time of
the challenged statement, engaged in the activity of selling or renting
housing.' 32 This would exclude, for example, statements made by
neighbors and others who have no authorized role in selling or renting the
housing involved. 33 It would also exclude statements by landlords and
130. See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at 1054-55; Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th
Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Fair Hous. Congress v.
Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1997); HUD v. Roberts, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,151, at 26,217-18 (HUD ALJ Jan. 19, 2001); HUD v.
Dellipaoli, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,127, at 26,076-77 (HUD
ALJ Jan. 7, 1997). The conclusion that oral as well as written statements are covered is also
supported by the lack of limiting language in the statute itself, the evolution of this language
and other evidence in the legislative history of the FHA, the natural meaning of the word
"statement," and the subsequent HUD regulation interpreting this provision, which provides
that "[t]he prohibitions in this section [3604(c)] shall apply to all written or oral notices or
statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling." 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b).
See generally Schwemm, supra note 128, at 214-15.
131. Cases finding a violation of § 3604(c) based on a single statement include
United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Dellipaoli, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,076-77; and Gutleben, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,725-26; see also Harris, 183 F.3d at 1054-55 (assuming
that single discriminatory statement may violate § 3604(c)); cf. City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 738-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the word
"any" in a different provision of the FHA should be broadly construed based on its plain
meaning).
132. See, e.g., Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (M.D. Pa. 1986)
(noting that § 3604(c)'s legislative history "indicates that by including the phrase 'with
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling,' Congress intended to reach the activities of
,.property owners, tract developers, real estate brokers, lending institutions, and all others
engaged in the sale, rental, or financing of housing"' (quoting Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 3296,
Amendment 561 to S. 3296, S. 1497, S. 1654, S. 2845, S. 2846, S. 2923 and S. 3170, 89th
Cong. 84 (1966) (testimony of Att'y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach)); 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b)
(HUD regulation interpreting § 3604(c) to apply to all statements by persons "engaged in the
sale or rental" of housing).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) 16,550, at 16,550.3-16,550.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2001) (holding that
§ 3604(c)'s "with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling" language does not apply to
discriminatory statements made by employees of a rental listing service because "only the
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other housing professionals made outside the context of their commercial
duties (e.g., in conversations with their family members or friends after
work).'34 The gist of these limitations is that § 3604(c) only bans
discriminatory statements made in a business context,135 a restriction that
will become important when the First Amendment implications of applying
this law to harassing statements are considered. 36  Even as so limited,
however, it is clear that § 3604(c) would cover the typical harassing
statement made by a landlord to a female tenant, at least if the statement is
considered "with respect to the . . . rental" of her apartment.
One problem here is that the word "rental" in § 3604(c) is ambiguous
concerning the time frame that is intended to be covered. Whereas the
word "sale" in the "with respect to the sale or rental" phrase presumably
only applies to the phases of a purchase situation ending with the closing of
the transaction, the word "rental" in this phrase can be read in either of
two ways-to cover only the initial decision to rent or to include also the
on-going relationship between landlord and tenant during the entire term of
the tenancy. This issue is of paramount importance to the applicability of §
3604(c) to sexual harassment, because the vast majority of housing
discriminatory comments of a person selling/renting his dwelling, or an agent acting on
behalf of that person, would have a direct influence on the disposition of the property."
(quoting Babin, 799 F. Supp. at 716)).
Thus, in situations where neighbors or other non-housing professionals are accused of
harassment in violation of the FHA, provisions other than § 3604(c), such as § 3617, would
have to be invoked. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (concerning § 3617's
applicability to harassment cases); see also Reeves, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. &
Bus.) at 16,250.5-16,250.7 (citing § 3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3617 in upholding FHA
claim against condominium association based on its failure to protect resident from
harassment by another resident).
134. See Schwemm, supra note 128, at nn.85 & 362 (legislative history of § 3604(c)
suggests that only public statements designed to have some effect on the sale or rental of
housing were intended to be covered by this provision). But see HUD v. Tucker, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,033 (HUD ALJ Aug. 24, 1992) (holding that
property manager's racist statements about tenant to customers and employees at restaurant
where tenant worked violated § 3604(c)).
135. The references in this Article to "a business context" and "the context of their
commercial duties" as proper interpretations of § 3604(c)'s "with respect to the sale or
rental" phrase are not meant to suggest that this law is limited to situations involving only
for-profit housing. Indeed, it is clear that § 3604(c) also applies to public housing, long-
term homeless shelters, and other dwellings where defendants may not be motivated by
profit maximization and where residents may not have traditional lease or payment
responsibilities. See, e.g., Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1175 (rejecting argument by operators
of homeless shelter that, because they did not charge shelter residents rent, they were
outside the scope of § 3604(c), and instead finding that, because the shelter received grant
moneys in consideration for its provision of services to the homeless, the operators "rented"
the property for purposes of § 3604(c)); cf. § 3604(e) (including a "for profit" requirement,
in contrast to § 3604(c) and the statute's other substantive prohibitions).
136. For a discussion of First Amendment considerations relating to the application
of § 3604(c) to housing harassment, see infra Part III.
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harassment cases occur in rental as opposed to sale situations and, within
rentals, after the initial decision to rent.
137
We conclude that "rental" within § 3604(c) does cover the entire time
of a tenant's stay. The common understanding of this word, as reflected in
the most prominent dictionary in existence at the time of § 3604(c)'s
enactment, supports this position by defining "rent" to include "the
possession and use" and the "possession and enjoyment of" property.,38 In
addition, the courts that have addressed this issue have generally held or
assumed that "rental" in § 3604(c) covers the full term of the lease. 139 This
conclusion also reflects the general view that the FHA, as remedial civil
rights legislation, should be given a broad interpretation, a view that the
Supreme Court has regularly endorsed. 40
Even if landlord-tenant conversations are within the time period
covered by § 3604(c), it might be argued that sexually harassing statements
should not be considered to be "with respect to the .. .rental of a
dwelling" if they do not relate directly to the terms or conditions of the
rental arrangement. "' The argument would be that a landlord's sex talk to
137. The only reported housing harassment case that does not involve a current
rental is Abrams, which involved a real estate broker and three salespersons who were
accused of harassing their female customers. 694 F. Supp. 1101; cf. Krueger, 115 F. 3d 487
(finding that landlord began harassing victim before she signed the lease and continued
harassing her throughout her tenancy).
138. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1923 (14th ed. 1961).
139. See, e.g., Gutleben, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,726
(rejecting landlord's argument that, because his racist statement to black tenant was not
made in the context of seeking a renter, it was not covered by § 3604(c), and instead holding
that such a remark is indeed "with respect to the ...rental of a dwelling" under this
provision); Tucker, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,348 (holding that
property manager's statements to tenant's boyfriend and co-workers that she wouldn't have
allowed tenant to move in if she had known tenant's boyfriend was Black violated §
3604(c)); HUD v. Williams, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,007, at
25,119 (HUD ALJ March 22, 1991) (assuming that landlord's intimidating conversation
with tenant was within the time frame covered by § 3604(c)); see also Harris, 183 F.3d at
1054-55 (suggesting that Black tenant may have § 3604(c) claim based on agent's remarks
that owners of apartment complex do not want to rent to Blacks); HUD v. Denton, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,014 (HUD ALJ Nov. 12, 1991), on remand,
2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,024 (HUD ALJ Feb. 7, 1992)
(holding that eviction notice containing discriminatory statement violates § 3604(c)). But
see Michael v. Caprice, No. 99 C 2313, 1999 WL 688733 at *2 (N.D. Il. 1999) ("As a
tenant already living in the building, Michael has not alleged a violation of § 3604(c).");
Texas, 85 F. Supp. at 730-33 (concluding that landlord's verbal harassment of Arab tenant is
sufficient to establish claims under §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617, but not under § 3604(c)).
140. E.g., City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731; Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 24, § 7:2.
141. As discussed in greater detail below, some sexually harassing statements
contain references to the terms of the tenancy, such as where a landlord requests sex in lieu
of rent. See infra text accompanying notes 196-99. However, in many other situations, the
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his female tenants should be considered "stray" remarks that do not
sufficiently relate to the "rental of a dwelling" to be covered by § 3604(c).
There is some support for this argument in the language of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Harris v. Itzhaki,'42 a decision that upheld a § 3604(c)
claim by a black tenant who overheard her landlord's agent tell another
employee that " [t]he owners don't want to rent to Blacks. ,13 In the course
of its opinion in Harris, the court opined that there could be no liability
under § 3604(c) for this discriminatory statement if it were just a "stray"
remark that was "unrelated to the decisional process [and therefore]
insufficient to show discrimination."1 44 In support of its view that §
3604(c) requires the offending statement be related to a housing provider's
"decisional process," Harris cited two Title VII cases 45 that had cited
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' 46 a non-
harassment employment discrimination case.
However, Harris's reliance on these Title VII precedents, particularly
Price Waterhouse, is questionable. The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse
claimed that her failure to make partner at her accounting firm was the
result of gender discrimination. 147 The evidence, which consisted mostly of
verbal and written statements, indicated that the partners may have
considered both legitimate and discriminatory factors in the partnership
decision.'48 As a result, the statements were being examined not as Title
VII violations in and of themselves, but as evidence of improper animus in
the decisional process. In the cited-to passage, Justice O'Connor simply
noted that discriminatory statements which are "unrelated to the decisional
process" cannot satisfy the plaintiff's burden in this type of case.' 49 This
Title VII analysis, however, is inapplicable to the situation presented by a
free-standing § 3604(c) claim, where the statement itself is the violation.150
Significantly, Justice O'Connor made clear that even if "stray remarks in
the workplace" are not related to hiring or promotion decisions, they may
be probative of sexual harassment."'
speech itself will have nothing to do with the rental (e.g., where a property manager makes
a sexually explicit comment to a tenant).
142. 183 F.3d at 1054-55.
143. Id. at 1048.
144. Id. at 1055.
145. Id. (citing Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.
1990); Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989)).
146. 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 232.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (noting that, unlike § 3604(c),
Title VII does not ban discriminatory statements).
151. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Meritor,
477 U.S. at 63-69). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
800
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There are several reasons why a landlord's harassing statements to a
tenant should be considered as having been made "with respect to the sale
or rental of a dwelling" even if the statements don't explicitly concern the
terms or conditions of the lease. First, the relationship between the
speaker and the target of the speech-landlord (or his agent) and tenant-is
a business relationship that exists, by definition, because the landlord is
engaged in the rental of the dwelling to the tenant. Second, virtually all
housing harassment takes place either inside the victim's apartment or
elsewhere at the property, 152 which are places of business for the landlord
and his agents. Finally, even if the harassing speech doesn't directly
concern the terms of a woman's lease, it certainly affects her experience in
renting the dwelling.'53
For purposes of § 3604(c), therefore, the argument that a landlord's
harassing statements to his tenant are not "with respect to the ... rental of
a dwelling" seems unpersuasive. This is particularly true in light of the
fact that § 3604(c) itself identifies the precise nature of the statements with
which it is concerned (i.e., those that "indicate[] any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on . . sex"). If a landlord makes a
statement to a current tenant that includes such an indication, the statement
should be considered covered by § 3604(c)'s "with respect to the . . .
rental of a dwelling" phrase. We next consider whether sexually harassing
statements do indicate such a "preference, limitation, or discrimination."
3. THE "INDICATES ANY PREFERENCE, LIMITATION, OR
DISCRIMINATION" ELEMENT
The requirement that an illegal statement under § 3604(c) must
"indicate [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination.., or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination" based on some
prohibited ground raises two distinct issues. The first deals with the word
"indicate." By banning every housing statement that "indicates"
discrimination, § 3604(c) is focused not on the defendant-speaker's intent,
but rather on the message that is actually conveyed by his words. Thus,
courts have interpreted § 3604(c) to cover every communication that
152-53 (2000) (finding that "potentially damning nature" of supervisor's discriminatory
comments is not to be discounted on the ground that they "were not made in the direct
context of [plaintiff's] termination").
152. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
153. Harassing speech may, for example, lead a woman to minimize contact with
her landlord by taking steps such as not requesting necessary maintenance, paying rent by
mail instead of in person, and remaining inside her apartment when the landlord is at the
property.
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indicates discrimination to an "ordinary listener," 54 regardless of whether
the defendant was motivated in putting it forth by discriminatory animus'
or whether the particular listener found the statement to be
discriminatory.156 This has led some judges to refer to § 3604(c) as a
"strict liability" statute. 157 All that is required to establish liability is a
showing that the defendant made a housing-related statement indicating a
"preference, limitation, or discrimination" based on one of the factors
made illegal by the FHA.
The second key part of this element of § 3604(c) is to determine
whether a reasonable person would understand the challenged statement to
indicate an illegal "preference," "limitation," or "discrimination." These
154. Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556; accord Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 315
(N.D.N.Y. 1995); Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. 1427, 1439-40 (E.D. Wash. 1993);
HUD v. Ro, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,106, at 25,929 (HUD
ALJ June 2, 1995). A similar "ordinary reader" standard is employed in evaluating written
communications, such as newspaper advertisements, challenged under § 3604(c). See, e.g.,
Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1996); Ragin v. Harry
Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905-07 (2d Cir. 1993); Housing Opportunities
Made Equal (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991); Ragin v.
N. Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1991); Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc.,
899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.
1972). According to the New York Times decision, "[t]he ordinary reader [or listener] is
neither the most suspicious nor the most insensitive of our citizenry." 923 F.2d at 1002.
These standards, with their focus on the reaction of an "ordinary" person receiving the
speech, are similar to the standards used in employment cases. The Supreme Court has
stated that the "objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. This inquiry
requires the court to consider "all of the circumstances" surrounding the harassment,
including the nature and frequency of the harassment, Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, and "the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target," Oncale,
523 U.S. at 81.
155. This is an important distinction between § 3604(c) and the FHA's other
substantive provisions, which generally outlaw certain practices only if they are undertaken
"because of" some prohibited factor, and therefore generally require focusing on the
defendant's intent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b), 3604(d)-(f)(2), 3605-3606 (1994). See
generally SCHWEMM, supra note 24, ch. 10. This is not, however, to say that evidence of
discriminatory intent is irrelevant in § 3604(c) cases. Where a statement is not overtly
discriminatory, evidence of the speaker's bias can be used as proof that the message
transmitted or received actually indicated discrimination. See, e.g., Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556;
Soules, 967 F.2d at 825; N. Y. Times, 923 F.2d at 1000.
156. See, e.g., HUD v. French, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.)
25,113, at 25,970, 25,974 (HUD ALJ Sept. 12, 1995) (finding a § 3604(c) violation where
landlord told complainant that she could not rent a second-story apartment because she had a
child, despite the fact that complainant, unaware at the time that the statement constituted
illegal familial status discrimination, had stated that "the policy sounded reasonable [to
her]"). A lack of subjective reaction to the statement, however, will undoubtedly affect the
damages the listener can recover. The complainant in French, for example, was only
awarded $500. Id. at 25,979.
157. E.g., Roberts, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,217;
Dellipaoli, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,077.
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three terms are not defined in the FHA. It seems likely that their presence
in § 3604(c) was derived from, and therefore intended to have the same
meaning as, comparable language in Title VII's provision outlawing
notices and advertisements that indicate a "preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination" based on an illegal factor.' However,
neither Title VII's legislative history nor case law interpreting this
provision of the employment statute casts any light on the meaning of these
terms. 159
In the absence of any direct evidence concerning the intended
definition of these terms, their ordinary meanings should control.
According to the most prominent dictionary in existence at the time of the
enactments of Title VII and the FHA, the relevant definition of
"preference" suggests that this term means "someone or something that is
preferred : an object of choice : favorite" as in to "[choose] : like better :
value more highly"; 60 the word "limitation" means "a restriction or
restraint imposed from without";161 and "discrimination" means "the act,
practice, or an instance of discriminating categorically rather than
individually" as in "the according of differential treatment to persons of an
alien race or religion" with "discriminate" meaning "to make a difference
in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of
individual merit." 16
2
Most of the judicial decisions that discuss the phrase "preference,
limitation, or discrimination" in § 3604(c) involve discriminatory
advertisements and the messages they send to prospective tenants. The
precise substantive meaning of the terms in this phrase is seldom discussed,
and courts seem comfortable in using the ordinary meaning of the words-
that is, that a "preference" implies that a particular person or group is
favored, that a "limitation" implies that a particular person or group is
restricted, and that "discrimination" implies that a particular person will be
treated more or less favorably because of membership in his or her race,
sex, or other class. The issue in many of the cases is how clear or obvious
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b). See also Schwemm, supra note 128, at 206-07.
159. No significant decision interpreting Title VII's ban on discriminatory notices
and ads in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) was produced in the four years prior to the enactment of
the FHA, and even to this day, only a handful of major § 2000e-3(b) cases exist. See, e.g.,
Brush v. S. F. Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that newspaper may not be sued under Title VII for
carrying employment ads in separate "Men" and "Women" categories); Hailes v. United
Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding male's claim based on
airline's ad for "stewardesses" in "Help Wanted-Female" column). See generally LARSON,
supra note 26, § 12.02(1) ("Challenges to discriminatory advertisements or notices by
employers are all but absent from modern case law.").
160. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1787 (14th ed. 1961).
161. Id. at 1312.
162. Id. at 648.
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the statement of preference or limitation must be in order to run afoul of §
3604(c). The analysis looks to the effect the challenged communication
has on the person receiving it and whether the "ordinary reader" or
"ordinary listener" would interpret the communication as indicating a
preference or limitation. 163
An early case involving a straightforward statement of preference is
United States v. Hunter, 64 where the Fourth Circuit held that a newspaper
ad for an apartment in a "white home" would indicate to the ordinary
reader that the landlord had a racial preference for white tenants. 165
Advertisements with less blatant statements have also been found to contain
preferences or limitations in violation of § 3604(c). In Guider v. Bauer ,,66
the court found that the words "perfect for single or couple" in an
apartment advertisement indicated a preference for families without
children. And in Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter,'67 the
court held that advertisements stating a preference for buyers and tenants
who spoke certain languages violated § 3604(c), because they indicated a
preference for persons of certain national origins.168 In an effort to assist
advertisers and publishers in complying with the FHA, HUD set forth
advertising guidelines listing words, phrases, and symbols that should be
avoided because they signal impermissible preferences or limitations. 1
69
These include specific terms related to protected classes, such as "Black,"
"Protestant," or "Italian"; catch words such as "private," "traditional," or
"integrated"; and colloquialisms that imply or suggest protected
categories. "'
163. See supra note 154.
164. 459 F.2d 205.
165. Id. at 215. See also United States v. Miss. Publ'g Corp., 2 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 19,352, at 19,477-478 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 22, 1986)
(newspaper agrees to consent decree for accepting housing advertisements with phrases such
as "white refined middle-aged Christian lady" and "black male").
166. 865 F. Supp. 492, 494 (N.D. I11. 1994).
167. 342 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D. I11. 1971).
168. Id. at 513.
169. Fair Housing Advertising Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,102 (Aug. 26, 1980).
This version of the Guidelines appeared at 24 C.F.R. § 109.5-30 for many years. 24
C.F.R. § 109 (1989). Additional advertising regulations appear at 24 C.F.R. § 100.75
(2002), which was originally promulgated in 1989. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3285 (Jan. 23, 1989).
In 1996, HUD removed 24 C.F.R. § 109, and sought to provide the guidance through
handbooks or other materials rather than maintaining it in the C.F.R. See 61 Fed. Reg.
14,380 (Apr. 1, 1996). HUD has not provided any new sources of guidance on the subject,
and so the pre-1996 Guidelines and § 100.75 remain the most useful referents. An earlier
version of the advertising Guidelines was originally adopted in 1972. See 37 Fed. Reg.
6700 (Apr. 1, 1972).
170. 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b), (d) (1995). HUD stopped short of saying that such
terms automatically signal a § 3604(c) violation, although clearly use of the words in §
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Even facially nondiscriminatory messages may indicate impermissible
preferences depending upon their context.171 In Ragin v. New York Times
Co. ," the Second Circuit, noting that "Congress used broad language in
Section 3604(c)," found that housing advertisements which for twenty
years almost exclusively featured white human models as home-seekers
violated the FHA.173 The court rejected a narrow construction of § 3604(c)
that would only prohibit "the most provocative and offensive expressions
of racism or statements indicating an outright refusal to sell or rent to
persons of a particular race."174 Instead, the Second Circuit defined
"preference, limitation, or discrimination" as anything that discourages an
ordinary reader of a particular race from answering an ad or, conversely,
encourages readers of a particular race to answer an ad.1
75
The terms "preference" and "limitation" make sense in the advertising
context because the act of soliciting renters or buyers contains an implicit
notion of selection in which preferences or limitations might come into
play. The advertisement is the vehicle for the seller/landlord to signal his
preferences, and as a result influence the behavior of the home-seekers
who read the ad. At first glance, these terms may not seem to translate as
easily into the housing harassment context, at least in those situations
where § 3604(c)'s applicability would be most needed (i.e., non-quid pro
quo harassment directed at a current tenant). However, as noted above,' 76
courts have applied this provision to the full term of a tenancy, so that
statements of "preference, limitation, or discrimination" to current as well
as prospective tenants are covered. Following the analysis in the
advertisement cases, it will also hold true that statements need not blatantly
express a preference or limitation in order to violate § 3604(c). Therefore,
109.20(b)(1)-(5) (which are indicative of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) would
constitute such a violation.
171. See, e.g., Soules, 967 F.2d at 824-25 (looking to the context of the statements
and evidence of the speaker's intent to determine whether statements indicated an
impermissible preference or limitation); see also Jancik, 44 F.3d at 557 (holding that, even
though landlord "did not expressly indicate a preference based on race," when viewed in
context, his statements indicated a racial preference).
172. 923 F.2d 995.
173. Id. at 999. According to the complaint in New York Times, the ads in question
had been run over a period of twenty years, featuring "thousands of human models of whom
virtually none were black." Id. at 998. The few Black models depicted service employees.
The only exception was that Black models portraying housing-seekers were used exclusively
in ads for housing in predominantly Black areas. Id.
174. Id. at 999.
175. Id. at 999-1000. In an earlier case dealing with this issue, a district court had
noted that "the natural interpretation of [a housing brochure featuring virtually no Black
models] is to indicate that [the defendants'] apartment complexes are for white, and not
black, tenants, thus discouraging blacks from seeking housing there." Saunders v. Gen.
Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1058 (E.D. Va. 1987).
176. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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to the extent that a sexually harassing statement discourages a tenancy
based on gender, that statement would constitute an impermissible
"preference or limitation" in violation of § 3604(c).
It is hard to see how the word "discrimination" adds much to the ban
on illegal statements of "preference" or "limitation" in § 3604(c).' 77
Indeed, given the fact that "discriminate" is also used in § 3604(b)'s
coverage of "terms or conditions" and that § 3604(b) has been interpreted,
like Title VII, to ban only harassment that is severe or pervasive,'78 it
might be argued that a statement of "discrimination" doesn't become
actionable under § 3604(c) until it passes such a quantitative or qualitative
threshold. This may go too far, however, because the "severe or
pervasive" test was developed for purposes of determining whether the
"terms or conditions" of a job under Title VII or of housing under §
3604(b) were being disrupted by sexual harassment, not to interpret the
word "discriminate" in those laws. 7 9 In any event, whether a statement
may indicate an illegal "discrimination" without also indicating an illegal
"preference" or "limitation" seems of limited practical importance in using
this part of § 3604(c) to challenge sexual harassment.
One additional part of § 3604(c) that may indeed be of some
independent value, however, is this section's concluding phrase, which
adds to the prohibitions against statements indicating illegal preferences,
limitations, and discrimination a ban on statements indicating "an intention
to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination." 8 ' This
phrase, which goes beyond the analogous provision in Title VII,' 8' adds
coverage for situations in which a housing provider makes a statement
indicating "an intention to" violate the FHA even if he does not carry out
this intention. 1
82
For example, in Jancik v. HUD,83 the defendant-landlord asked the
race of people who called him on the phone to inquire about an
apartment. 184 The Seventh Circuit held that such questions violated §
177. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(2) (HUD regulation interpreting § 3604(c) to
prohibit statements that express "a preference for or limitation on any purchaser or renter"
because of a prohibited factor without also mentioning statements that express a similar
"discrimination"); Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556-57 (upholding determination that defendant's ads
and statements violated § 3604(c) based on their indications of "preference" and
"limitation" regarding familial status without also considering whether they indicated
"discrimination").
178. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text (Title VII) and notes 64-65 and
accompanying text (§ 3604(b)).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
181. See id. § 2000e-3(b). See generally Schwemm, supra note 128, at 210-11.
182. Schwemm, supra note 128, at 210-11.
183. 44 F.3d 553.
184. Id. at 554-55.
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3604(c) even though they did not express an explicit racial preference,
because, in the context of a screening interview, they "did indicate an
intent to discriminate."' 8 5 Another example of the use of § 3604(c)'s
concluding phrase occurred in Holmgren, where a district court concluded
that housing ads expressing a preference for certain foreign language
speakers were unlawful because, even if such ads did not indicate an illegal
preference based on national origin per se, they at least demonstrated "an
intention to make such a preference" in violation of § 3604(c).' 86 Indeed, a
number of FHA decisions have found § 3604(c) violations based on
housing providers' statements indicating "an intention to" engage in illegal
discrimination, even where the defendants, contrary to such
communications, actually made their housing available on a non-
discriminatory basis."8 7
The "intention to" language in § 3604(c) is significant for housing
harassment situations, because it allows the statute to reach statements that
185. Id. at 557. See also HUD v. Blackwell, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen
L. & Bus.) 25,001, at 25,009 (HUD ALJ Dec. 21, 1989) (holding that homeowner
violated § 3604(c) by asking broker the race of potential buyers), aff'd, 908 F.2d 864 (1 th
Cir. 1990); Roberts, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 26,218 (holding that
landlord violated § 3604(c) by asking the race and nationality of potential tenants because a
reasonable person when asked these questions would assume that race would be used as a
factor in determining eligibility); cf. Soules, 967 F.2d at 824 (agreeing that a landlord's
inquiry about a prospective tenant's race would violate § 3604(c) because there is "simply
no legitimate reason for considering an applicant's race," but holding that inquiries
concerning familial status are not per se illegal because there might be nondiscriminatory
justifications for such questions).
186. 342 F. Supp. at 513. Holmgren is also discussed supra text accompanying
notes 167-68.
187. See, e.g., HUD v. Kormoczy, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.)
25,071, at 25,661 n.7 (HUD ALJ May 16, 1994) (finding that "a statement need not be
true in order to constitute a violation of § 3604(c)"), aff'd, 53 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1995);
Blomgren, 850 F. Supp. at 1439-40 (awarding summary judgment in favor of plaintiff with
minor son on her § 3604(c) claim based on defendant's distribution of nonenforced "no
children" rules); HUD v. Schuster, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.)
25,091, at 25,834 (HUD ALJ Jan. 13, 1995) (holding that statement expressing a preference
against families with children violates § 3604(c) "regardless of the absence of any
application or enforcement of the language"); HUD v. Carter, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,029, at 25,319 (HUD ALJ May 1, 1992) (holding that mobile home
park's rule barring families with children violates § 3604(c), even though rule was not
enforced). But see HUD v. Kutney, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.)
25,089, at 25,821 (HUD ALJ Nov. 23, 1994) (concluding that landlord's statement that he
"normally likes to keep children under ten on the first floor" does not violate § 3604(c),
because it was shown that this policy was never "actually applied or put into effect");
Gutleben, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,725 (holding that landlord's
statements expressing concern about the damage and noise that children may cause do not
violate § 3604(c) where she stated in the same conversation that she knew she could not act
on such a concern because it would violate the law). See generally Schwemm, supra note
128, at 301.
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signal an intent to discriminate to the ordinary listener, without actually
requiring proof of a discriminatory act. Thus, for example, where a
landlord makes a statement threatening a tenant with eviction if she does
not have sex with him but does not carry out this threat, he would seem to
have violated § 3604(c)'s concluding phrase, for his statement indicates
"an intention to" engage in illegal discrimination (i.e., quid pro quo
harassment). And this would be true even if traditional Title VII analysis
would lead to the conclusion that he has not engaged in quid pro quo
harassment and that this single instance of verbal threatening might not
constitute sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to alter the "terms or
conditions" of the tenancy in violation of § 3604(b).' 8
Given the directive to interpret the FHA's language broadly,8 9 it is
not at all far-fetched to conclude that most instances of verbal harassment
would be covered by the "preference, limitation, or discrimination" phrase
or at least the "intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination" phrase in § 3604(c). The only remaining issue is whether
such harassing statements should be considered "based on ... sex" as that
phrase is used in § 3604(c).
4. THE "BASED ON ... SEX" ELEMENT
Most § 3604(c) decisions do not devote much space to discussing the
requirement that the defendant's offending communication must indicate a
preference, limitation, or discrimination "based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." The presence of this
element generally appears obvious, at least once the determination has been
made that an ordinary listener/reader would have interpreted the
defendant's statement, ad, or notice as indicating some form of preference,
discrimination, or limitation. In dealing with sexual harassment, however,
it is worth considering this "based on ...sex" part of § 3604(c) as an
independent requirement, because a defendant-landlord might argue that, in
directing sexual comments to a particular individual and not to allfemale
tenants, his remarks should not be considered "based on . . .sex."
This potential defense, however, should be easily dealt with in light of
the guidance available from Title VII sexual harassment precedents,
particularly Oncale.'90 In Oncale, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
male-on-male harassment could be actionable under Title VII.' 9' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on Title VII's requirement that
188. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742; See infra note 198 for a description of
Burlington Industries.
189. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
190. 523 U.S. 75.
191. Id. at 82.
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the defendant's actions must amount to discrimination "because of...
sex." In applying this phrase to a particular situation, Justice Scalia's
opinion noted:
"The critical issue .. . is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination
easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations,
because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume
those proposals would not have been made to someone of the
same sex .... But harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in
such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to
the presence of women in the workplace.' 92
This passage, as well as Oncale's holding applying Title VII's
"because of . . . sex" language to the specific male-on-male situation
involved there, demonstrates that this element is satisfied if the challenged
conduct is directed to an individual plaintiff (as opposed to all members of
his/her sex); that the inference of "because of. . .sex" discrimination is
easy to draw in the typical male-female harassment situation involving
"proposals of sexual activity"; that the harasser may, but need not be,
motivated by sexual desire; and that "sex-specific and derogatory terms"
directed to a female are to be considered "because of . . .sex" if the
harasser would not expose members of the opposite sex to such remarks. 93
192. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
193. See also Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090 (concluding that, in evaluating hostile
environment claim based on § 3604(b)'s prohibition of discriminatory terms and conditions
"because of sex," the "offensive acts need not be purely sexual; it is sufficient that they
would not have happened but for [the] claimant's gender"). Title VII cases have taken the
same approach with respect to harassment "because of sex." See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui
Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that harassment "because of
race" can take the form of sexual or gender-based insults or threats directed only at a person
of a particular race, and vice versa); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565
(6th Cir. 1999) (noting that "the conduct underlying a sexual harassment claim need not be
overtly sexual in nature" and joining other circuits in holding that "[a]ny unequal treatment
of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's gender" may constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII); cf. Jancik, 44 F.3d at 557 (rejecting landlord's
defense to § 3604(c) claim based on racial inquiries to would-be tenants that his remarks
should not be considered "based on race" under this statute because they were "merely
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Because this is the proper interpretation of Title VII's (and § 3604(b)'s)
"because of ... sex" requirement in harassment cases involving "terms or
conditions," the same principles should be applied to harassment cases
brought under § 3604(c)'s "based on... sex" language.
A final observation from Oncale concerning the elements of a §
3604(c) violation is appropriate here. Having shown that these elements do
seem to be applicable to many cases of verbal harassment in housing,
candor compels the recognition that the use of § 3604(c) to challenge
sexually harassing statements was not the principal concern that motivated
Congress to enact this provision, particularly when it is remembered that
the crucial elements necessary to bring such a claim derive from language
created at three distinct moments (i.e., the "preference, limitation,... or
discrimination" language from Title VII in 1964; the addition to this
provision in the 1968 FHA of the word "statement" and of the prohibitions
against ads, notices, and statements indicating an "intention to"
discriminate in the original version of § 3604(c); and the 1974 addition of
"sex" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in § 3604(c) and the
FHA's other substantive provisions).'94 Nevertheless, if the current
elements of § 3604(c) do indeed cover individual instances of verbal
harassment in housing, we do not flinch from the conclusion that this was
precisely what Congress intended. For, just as Justice Scalia wrote for a
unanimous Court in Oncale in holding that male-on-male harassment could
violate Title VII:
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed. 195
conversational"). The commentators generally agree with these conclusions regarding the
"because of sex" requirement. See generally L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment as
Discrimination "Because of Sex ": Have We Come Full Circle?, 27 OHo N.U. L. REV. 439
(2001); Christopher W. Deering, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-Examine
the Legal Underpinnings of Title Vii's Ban on Discrimination "Because of" Sex, 27 CUMB.
L. REV. 231 (1996-1997).
194. See supra, respectively, note 158 and accompanying text; notes 105-07 and
accompanying text; and note 15 and accompanying text.
195. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. Moreover, such an approach is consistent with the
Supreme Court's recognition that anti-discrimination laws in general, and the Fair Housing
Act in particular, are to be broadly construed and applied. See, e.g., Oxford House, 514
U.S. at 731; Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 380; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209; Meritor, 477
U.S. at 64 (finding that, with Title VII, Congress intended "to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women" in employment) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Power
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The next Section further explores whether "the provisions of" §
3604(c) go beyond the principal evil to which this provision may have been
directed to also prohibit verbal harassment in housing.
B. § 3604(c) Applied to Hostile Environment Cases
1. APPLICATION TO BASIC TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT SITUATIONS
Part II.A established that the language used in § 3604(c) may be
interpreted to cover some hostile environment situations in which it might
be difficult to prove violations of the FHA's other sections. Here, we
describe three common types of sexually harassing statements in order to
determine the extent to which § 3604(c) applies.
First is a category of statements that we call "sexual requests."'19 6 This
would involve situations in which a landlord asks a tenant to engage in
sexual activity with him, and implies that her continued tenancy and/or its
terms or conditions might be conditioned on her acquiescence. 197 Suppose
further that the tenant ignores this veiled threat, but the landlord does not
evict her or do anything else to impede her tenancy. The tenant would be
unable to make out a quid pro quo claim because she suffered no tangible
loss of housing benefits, and it is unlikely (although not impossible) that
she could meet the "severe or pervasive" standard for a hostile
environment claim based on this single statement.'98 However, the
and Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). See also PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) (noting, in the course of giving an expansive
interpretation to anti-disability discrimination statute, that "the fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.") (quoting Penn. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212
(1998) (also an ADA case)).
196. See, e.g., Cahan, supra note 3, at 1064 (identifying solicitations of sexual
behavior by promise of an award or threat of punishment as common forms of sexual
harassment in housing according to survey responses); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the
Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1990) (identifying requests or demands for
sex as one type of sexually harassing speech).
197. See Strauss, supra note 196, at 7. Professor Strauss argues that, when a
request for sex is made by a person in a position of authority, it carries an implied threat of
repercussion if the listener does not acquiesce, or an implied promise of favorable treatment
if she does. Therefore, "as a practical matter, a request often acts as a demand." Id.
198. This situation was discussed in the employment context in Burlington
Industries, 524 U.S. 742. There, the plaintiff's supervisor made numerous veiled requests
for sex and implied that tangible job benefits, including a promotion, would depend on her
willingness to comply. Id. at 747-48. The plaintiff refused these overtures and was
promoted anyway, but she ultimately quit because of her supervisor's behavior. The Court
found that, because the plaintiff's claim involved only unfulfilled threats, it should be
categorized as a hostile environment claim rather than a quid pro quo claim. Id. at 754.
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landlord's statement clearly indicates an "intent to discriminate," even
though he did not actually follow through with his expressed intent. As
discussed above, a speaker need not carry out the discrimination threatened
in his statement in order to violate § 3604(c).199 It is sufficient that the
statement indicate to the ordinary listener an intent to discriminate.
Therefore, § 3604(c) would be applicable to many statements of the
"sexual request" variety.
A landlord's directing "sexual epithets," such as "bitch" or "whore,"
to a female tenant is another common type of harassing scenario."' Under
§ 3604(b), a single incident of this type of harassment would probably not
constitute actionable discrimination, because it would not be severe or
pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of the victim's tenancy.20 '
As demonstrated in the previous Section, however, a landlord's gender-
based expression of animosity towards the tenant as a woman could signal
to an ordinary listener that the landlord has a low estimation of all women
or at least of this particular tenant "based on . . . [her] sex. "20 The
statement could also be seen, according to the Second Circuit's analysis in
New York Times,2 3 as discouraging female tenants from living at the
property. 24  Therefore, sexual epithets would generally constitute
impermissible statements of preference or limitation based on sex in
violation of § 3604(c). 20 5
The third category of potentially harassing statements can be described
as "sexual comments," which can further be divided into two
subcategories: "explicit statements" and "flirtatious statements." Explicit
The Court found that the supervisor's behavior did create a hostile environment, but it
limited this finding to the facts of the case, noting that "[tihe case before us involves
numerous alleged threats, and we express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat
is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment." Id.
199. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
200. See Cahan, supra note 3, at 1064 (finding that abusive remarks were one of the
most common forms of housing harassment in survey responses); Strauss, supra note 196, at
8 (identifying degrading sexual epithets as one type of sexually harassing speech).
201. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008-09; Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman &
Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995, 1007-08 (N.D. I11. 1998). In Cavalieri-Convey, the court relied
on DiCenso in ruling for a property manager who was accused of sexual harassment in
violation of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) based on "only two occasions" that did not go beyond
"an offensive, verbal insult" (i.e., threatening to call plaintiff a whore if she had male
visitors). See id. at 1008 (citing DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008). The pro se plaintiff in
Cavalieri-Conway did not assert a claim under § 3604(c).
202. See supra Part II.A.4.
203. 923 F.2d at 1000.
204. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Gutleben, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,726
(holding that landlord's use of racial epithets toward tenant and her children conveyed an
intention not to rent to them because of their race and therefore indicated a preference or
limitation based on race in violation of § 3604(c)).
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statements are unambiguously sexual and, assuming they are unwelcome,. 6
would clearly be offensive to the ordinary listener. Examples would
include comments about a woman's body (particularly intimate body parts),
speculation about what sort of sexual partner a woman would be or how
many sexual partners she has had, graphic descriptions of sexual acts, and
the like.207 If a landlord made one or two such statements to a female
tenant, it is unlikely that this would be sufficiently severe or pervasive to
violate § 3604(b). However, explicit statements are likely to cause
embarrassment, fear, and/or anger in the average listener. They signal that
the landlord views women in general, or at least the particular tenant, as a
sexual object. This would indicate that the landlord has a low estimation of
women, and it would discourage female tenants from living at the
property. Therefore, much like sexual epithets, sexually explicit
statements would generally be considered as expressing a gender-based
preference or limitation in violation of § 3604(c).
Flirtatious statements, in contrast, would include more benign, less
overtly sexual comments, such as telling a woman "you are very
attractive" or calling a woman "honey," "baby," etc. While such
statements might make a listener feel uncomfortable or demeaned, they are
not as blatant or offensive as sexually explicit statements,"' and it would be
harder to argue that they automatically indicate impermissible preferences
and limitations to the ordinary listener. As a result, such statements would
not be unlawful per se. This does not mean, however, that flirtatious
statements can never violate § 3604(c). Rather, it means that a court
would have to look to the context of the statement-including what sort of
conversation preceded it, where it was made, where the speaker was
standing in relation to the listener, and other relevant factors-as well as
206. Unlike harassment under Title VII or § 3604(b), a § 3604(c) violation does not
require a showing that the speech was unwelcome or offensive to a particular listener or
reader. Put another way, there is no subjective requirement contained in the text of §
3604(c) or recognized by the cases interpreting it. A listener may be unaffected by-or even
agree with-a landlord's discriminatory statement and a violation can still be found. See,
e.g., French, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,970, 25,974; see also
supra note 157 and accompanying text. HUD's proposed sexual harassment regulations do
include an "unwelcomeness" requirement, but it appears that these regulations are geared
toward "terms and conditions" cases brought under § 3604(b). See Fair Hous. Act
Regulations Amends. Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 67666-
68 (Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); discussion infra notes 234-44 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, sexual statements obviously have different implications if
they occur between two willing parties. As § 3604(c) becomes more widely used in sexual
harassment cases, courts will no doubt fashion ways to deal with this complication.
207. See Strauss, supra note 196, at 7-8.
208. See id. at 9 (noting that there is no societal consensus that terms such as
"sweetie" and "honey" are offensive or degrading).
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evidence of the speaker's actual intent in order to determine whether the
statement indicated an impermissible preference or limitation." 9
2. APPLICATION TO DICENSO AND HONCE
In light of the discussion above, we now apply § 3604(c) to the claims
in the two published federal appellate decisions that have dealt in detail
with hostile environment sexual harassment in housing, DiCenso210 and
Honce.
DiCenso appears to be just the sort of case in which a § 3604(c)
harassment claim should be successful in filling the gaps left by the "severe
or pervasive" standard. In this case, the landlord came to the plaintiff's
door to collect the rent. He touched her arm and back suggestively, and
stated that if she didn't have the money, she could "take care of it in other
ways."" 2 When the plaintiff slammed the door in his face, the landlord
stood outside and called her a "bitch" and a "whore. 2 13 The plaintiff and
her boyfriend subsequently had confrontations with the landlord, and he
evicted them. 14 Although recognizing that the landlord's "comment
vaguely invited [the plaintiff] to exchange sex for rent" and that the
plaintiff found his "remarks to be subjectively unpleasant," the Seventh
Circuit determined that this single incident was not severe enough to create
an objectively hostile environment under traditional Title VII standards.215
209. See supra notes 171, 185 and accompanying text; see also infra note 224 and
accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit recently endorsed the approach of analyzing the
complete context in which a statement is made in order to determine how the statement
should be interpreted. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The court held that particular statements, which contained
no threatening language, should be considered threats when "the whole factual context, and
all of the circumstances" surrounding the statement were taken into account. Id. at 1078
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 1074-75 n.7 (citing numerous
cases from other circuits and concluding that "all consider context"); id. at 1089 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that threatening statements must be considered "in
the entire context and under all circumstances"). For further discussion of this case see
infra note 371 and accompanying text. In terms of sexual harassment, one can imagine a
scenario in which a landlord makes an apparently innocuous flirtatious statement to a female
tenant, but the context in which the statement is made causes the words to take on a different
meaning. A statement like "you look good today, honey" becomes much more sinister if it
is uttered, for example, by a landlord who is standing in the doorway to a female tenant's
apartment and holding his set of keys that allow him to enter her apartment at any time, or
by a landlord who has just warned his female tenant about her late rent payment.
210. 96 F.3d 1004.
211. 1 F.3d 1085.
212. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1006.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1009.
2002:771 Sexual Harassment in Housing and § 3604(c) 815
There are two statements in DiCenso to which § 3604(c) could apply:
the veiled request for sex in lieu of rent, and the epithets the defendant
directed at the plaintiff after she rebuffed his advances. Either of these
statements, standing alone, should be sufficient to violate § 3604(c). The
sex-for-rent request, which falls into the "sexual request" category of
harassing speech discussed above, communicated an intent to discriminate
against the victim-to exact sex from her if she was unable to pay the rent.
Even though the landlord failed to follow up on his request, his statement
communicated this intent. The sexual epithets, which fall into the second
category of harassing speech discussed above, are statements of a gender-
based preference or limitation. Both statements, therefore, could have
been found to violate § 3604(c), if claims under this provision had been
asserted.
Honce presents a more difficult fact pattern. The plaintiff's landlord
asked her to attend social and religious events with him on three occasions,
and she declined every invitation. 216 Eventually, the landlord asked the
plaintiff, "When can we go out?,, 217 The plaintiff then told him that she did
not want to go out with him at all, and the landlord replied that he had only
wanted to be friends and did not ask her out again.21s Over the course of
the next six weeks, the plaintiff and the landlord had a series of disputes
about the property. Their final confrontation took place when the plaintiff
tried to construct a fence in her yard. The landlord sent the workmen
away and got into a shouting match with the plaintiff.21 9 As the landlord
was driving away, the plaintiff's dog ran in front of his car, and he revved
the engine as though he was going to hit the dog. 220 The plaintiff left the
property the next day and officially vacated a few weeks later.21
Honce doesn't involve clearly offensive statements like DiCenso,
making a liability determination under § 3604(c) more difficult. The
landlord made no explicit or veiled sexual requests and did not imply that
the plaintiff's tenancy was contingent upon her going out with him socially.
The landlord made no statements of a sexual nature, and he did not make
any disparaging or degrading remarks about women. The only statements
were the invitations, which themselves were fairly benign,2 2 and the
question, "When can we go out?" 2 3






222. The landlord had invited the plaintiff to a religious seminar, asked her to view
some property with him, and offered to take her and her son to the state fair. Id.
223. The dissent, however, cites the testimony of a police officer who said the
plaintiff had told him that the defendant was "coming to the house at all hours of the night
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One could argue that these statements indicated a "preference or
limitation" for the plaintiff as a woman. For facially nondiscriminatory
statements of this sort, however, a court would have to look to factors such
as the context of the statement and the intent of the speaker.224 Certainly,
such persistent requests could indicate to the ordinary listener that the
landlord was interested in having a sexual relationship with the plaintiff.
However, this conclusion could be weakened by the landlord's statement
that he "only wanted to be friends. , 2 5
3. A NOTE ON HUD'S SEXUAL HARASSMENT REGULATION
HUD is authorized to promulgate regulations interpreting the FHA,226
much like the EEOC is under Title VII. 227 Pursuant to this authority and to
a specific directive in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,228 HUD
published a detailed set of fair housing regulations in 1989.229 In
accordance with the doctrine established in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,23° HUD regulations interpreting the FHA are
to be followed so long as they are "a permissible construction of the
statute. ,231
As detailed as they otherwise were, however, the 1989 HUD fair
housing regulations dealt with sexual harassment only in the most
superficial way. The only reference in these regulations to sexual
harassment was in the section interpreting § 3604(b), which simply listed
an example of quid pro quo harassment as one of the practices forbidden
and banging on her door, screaming at her obscenities and all types of abusive language."
Id. at 1095 n.2 (Seymour, J., dissenting). This is the only mention in either of the opinions
of additional offensive or threatening statements.
224. See, e.g., Jancik, 44 F.3d at 557; Soules, 967 F.2d at 824-25.
225. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1087.
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608, 3614a.
227. Id. § 2000e-4; see, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The EEOC guidelines
concerning sexual harassment were originally published in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676-77
(Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001)).
228. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ordered the Secretary of HUD to
"issue rules to implement" the newly amended FHA within 180 days after the enactment of
the Amendments Act. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, sec.
13(b), 102 Stat. 1636 (1988) (set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 note).
229. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 14, 100,
103-106, 109-110, 115, 121).
230. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). For a recent case describing the nature of
"Chevron deference" and the situations in which such deference is warranted, see Mead,
533 U.S. at 227-31.
231. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Pursuant to Chevron, numerous FHA decisions
have deferred to HUD's fair housing regulations. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra
note 24, at § 7:5 n.17.
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by this provision. 21 2 This limited, rather obvious-and therefore not very
helpful-coverage of sexual harassment in the HUD regulations caused one
court in 1996 to remark critically that "HUD has not even enacted
guidelines regarding hostile housing environment sex discrimination.
233
In November of 2000 at the "Eleventh Hour" of the Clinton
Administration, HUD issued a proposed rule that would have amended its
fair housing regulations to establish detailed standards for evaluating claims
of sexual harassment under the FHA.234 This proposed rule specifically
noted that sexual harassment may violate § 3604(c), as well as other
portions of the FHA.235 However, the rule mainly approached sexual
harassment from the touchstone of § 3604(b), meaning that most of the rule
was concerned with setting forth guidelines to determine when conduct is
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment that would
unlawfully alter the "terms or conditions" of housing. Nevertheless, two
aspects of the proposed rule are significant to the application of § 3604(c)
in housing harassment cases.
First, the proposed rule endorsed a "totality of the circumstances"
test, similar to the test first set forth in the Title VII cases, for determining
whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 36 According to the
proposed rule, critical factors in applying this test include "the context,
nature, severity, scope, frequency, duration, and location of the incidents,
as well as the identity, number, relative ages and relationships of the
persons involved. ,2 37 This list is most notable for what it does not contain.
The first version of the test, as originally articulated by Supreme Court in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,238 also included the following factor:
"whether [the conduct] is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance;"239 with the obvious implication that a "mere offensive
232. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(5) (2002) (listing the following as an example of a
prohibited action: "Denying or limiting services or facilities in connection with the sale or
rental of a dwelling, because a person failed or refused to provide sexual favors").
233. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1007.
234. 65 Fed. Reg. 67,666-68 (proposed Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100).
235. "Sexual harassment violates the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis
of sex found in sections 804(a), 804(b), 804(c), 805, and 806 of the [Fair Housing] Act.
Sexual harassment can also violate section 818 of the Act." Id. at 67,666. The references
in these statements are to the original section numbers within the 1968 Fair Housing Act,
which are now codified, respectively, at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), § 3604(b), § 3604(c), § 3605,
§ 3606, and § 3617.
236. The test was first articulated in Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
237. 65 Fed. Reg. 67,668 (proposed Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §
100.500(b)).
238. 510 U.S. at 23.
239. Id. (emphasis added). This phrase appears to have its origins in Rogers, 454
F.2d 234. There, the court stated that it did not wish "to be interpreted as holding that an
employer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings
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utterance" would not be sufficient to violate Title VII. Despite the fact that
it was adopted in the Title VII context, this language has been relied on in
housing harassment cases, frequently to prevent a victim of verbal
harassment from asserting a claim under § 3604(b).2 40 HUD's proposed
regulation rejected this position, at least by implication.
Secondly, the proposed rule's definition of "unwelcome conduct"
made clear that this term "may include, but is not limited to, sexual
epithets. 241 This, combined with the conspicuous absence of the "mere
offensive utterance" factor, gives added impetus to the notion that
statement-based harassment should be considered an actionable form of
sexual harassment under the FHA.
This proposed regulation has not been finally adopted. The proposal
called for the comment period to end on January 12, 2001,242 but shortly
thereafter, the Bush Administration took office, and no further action on
this proposal has been taken by HUD to date. In the absence of a final
regulation, it cannot be said that courts should defer to the understanding
of § 3604(c)'s role in sexual harassment cases reflected in HUD's 2000
proposal.243 Nevertheless, on the theory that HUD's proposed rule simply
reflected a correct understanding of current FHA law, as opposed to being
considered an effort to expand this law, the existence of even the proposed
rule may be taken as support for the position that victims of verbal
harassment in housing should be able to bring claims under § 3604(c). 244
C. Summary
Part II has demonstrated that § 3604(c) appears to be applicable to
most types of sexually harassing speech. It is clear to us that this law
covers sexual requests, sexual epithets, and sexually explicit statements and
may cover flirtatious statements depending upon the context in which they
in an employee" should constitute harassment. Id. at 238, cited with approval in Meritor,
477 U.S. at 67.
240. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008; Hall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5718, at
*3-4; Cavalieri-Conway, 992 F. Supp. at 1008; Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 497.
241. 65 Fed. Reg. 67,668 (proposed Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §
100.500(c)).
242. Id. at 67,666.
243. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
244. Obviously, HUD's authority to issue fair housing regulations does not
encompass the power to take positions that are inconsistent with the clear meaning of the
statute. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 514-15 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (opining that the EEOC has the power to issue regulations as long as they are
consistent with existing definitions and interpretations); Capitol Mortgage Bankers, Inc. v.
Cuomo, 222 F.3d 151, 154-55 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that HUD has similar power to
issue regulations). Therefore, the 2000 proposal must be seen as an effort by HUD simply
to reflect the intended meaning of the FHA vis-A-vis sexual harassment.
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are made. Had a § 3604(c) claim been made in DiCenso and Honce, at
least one of these cases-DiCenso-should have had a different result.
Nevertheless, no case has ever held that a defendant's statement-based
sexual harassment violates § 3604(c) without also violating one of the
other, conduct-focused provisions of the FHA. Nor has any harassment
case provided separate relief under § 3604(c) or otherwise indicated that
the § 3604(c) claim was of independent significance apart from the FHA's
other substantive prohibitions. Advocates have generally overlooked §
3604(c)'s potential, choosing to focus instead on sections of the FHA that
prohibit the denial of housing or discrimination in terms and conditions. It
may also be the case that many women who are victims of the sort of
"non-severe or pervasive" verbal harassment that may violate § 3604(c) do
not realize that such statements are prohibited and therefore don't seek
redress. If, however, sexually harassing statements to home-seekers and
current tenants can be deemed to violate § 3604(c) even if those statements
are not sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to meet the traditional standards
for § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) claims, then the protection against harassment
in one's home provided by the FHA may well be greater than it is in the
workplace under Title VII.
One hurdle remains to reaching this conclusion: the First
Amendment's limitation on Congress's ability to pass laws that abridge the
freedom of speech. 45 This final hurdle to using § 3604(c) to challenge
harassing housing statements is considered in Part III.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Overview; the Basic Problem
A landlord or other housing provider accused of violating § 3604(c)
by making sex-based harassing statements might well be expected to assert
that his remarks are protected by the First Amendment.24 6 After all, this
245. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
246. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 248. Claims brought under § 3604(c) may be
more likely than those under other anti-harassment laws to invite a First Amendment
challenge for the simple reason that there will be one fewer defense. Indeed, in Title VII
hostile environment cases, defendants rarely raise First Amendment arguments. See
Schwemm, supra note 128, at 292 n.478; Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 512
(1991); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual
Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 403,
415-16 (1991). Instead, they usually just litigate whether the alleged conduct occurred and,
if it did, whether it was severe or pervasive enough to constitute illegal harassment. Only
after a finding or admission that the defendant engaged in such harassment will a defendant
look to the First Amendment, making it "a defense of last resort." Horton, supra, at 416.
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statute by its terms bans certain types of communications and does so based
on their content (e.g., statements that "indicate[ a] preference, limitation,
or discrimination based on... sex"), so a statement-based § 3604(c) claim
would naturally invite a First Amendment defense. True, § 3604(c) is
limited to communications that are made "with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling," but in this narrow context, it is undeniable that the statute
is a content-based restriction on speech and, as such, would ordinarily be
subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny in a challenge based on
the First Amendment.247
Despite the rather obvious potential for conflict between § 3604(c) and
the First Amendment, little has been written about this subject. Only a few
court decisions have addressed § 3604(c)'s relation to the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.2 4 And while many commentators have
discussed the tension between other civil rights laws that prevent
A § 3604(c) defendant, on the other hand, will not be able to use the "not severe or
pervasive" argument. See supra text accompanying note 131. Thus, even though the First
Amendment may also be the defense of last resort in § 3604(c) harassment cases, the
defendant will get there more quickly than his Title VII counterpart.
247. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) ("Where a government restricts the speech of a private person,
the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a
precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest."); Police Dep't of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992)
(standard of review discussed infra notes 256 and 273).
248. E.g., United States v. Racey, No. 96-2023, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10151, at
*3 (4th Cir. May 7, 1997) (holding that First Amendment does not protect landlord from
liability for anti-black statement in violation of § 3604(c)); HOME, 943 F.2d at 650-53
(rejecting "aggregate message" theory of liability in human model advertising case against
newspaper because this theory hinges on a construction of § 3604(c) that raises serious First
Amendment concerns); New York Times, 923 F.2d at 1002 (rejecting First Amendment
defense to § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory newspaper advertising); Stewart v. Furton, 774
F.2d 706, 710 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying that landlord's biased statement unrelated to a
specific discriminatory transaction would raise difficult First Amendment issues); Hunter,
459 F.2d at 211-15 (holding that § 3604(c)'s application to discriminatory housing ad does
not violate newspaper's constitutional rights). Non-§ 3604(c) cases have also recognized the
potential for First Amendment conflict in the enforcement of fair housing laws. See United
States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that, to the extent district court based its finding of discrimination on defendant's statement
that he believed the FHA to be unconstitutional, this violated the First Amendment);
Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293, 296, 298 (D. N.D. 1978) (holding that landlord's
statement to investigator that "spics, niggers, wops, Jew boys and the ACLU" were ruining
the country was a statement of opinion, albeit a bigoted one, that was protected by the First
Amendment).
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harassment and the First Amendment,249 few have dealt with this subject in
the context of the FHA. °
Furthermore, the distinction between the First Amendment
implications of claims under § 3604(c) and claims under other civil rights
laws is significant, because only § 3604(c) seeks to ban speech per se. It is
worth remembering here that the provision in Title VII that has been used
in harassment cases-even hostile environment cases based primarily on
sexual comments-is the one that outlaws discrimination in the "terms and
conditions" of employment25' and not Title VII's prohibition against
discriminatory notices and ads, which, as we have seen, does not also ban
discriminatory statements."' Indeed, neither Title VII nor any other federal
anti-discrimination statute of which we are aware purports, by its terms, to
ban biased statements, as § 3604(c) does. As such, § 3604(c) raises unique
First Amendment issues. 3
There are two basic approaches to defending § 3604(c) from First
Amendment challenge. The first is to accept the fact that, as a content-
based restriction on speech, § 3604(c) will be subjected to a high level of
judicial scrutiny and attempt to satisfy this standard. This standard
requires that the government show that its restriction on speech serves "a
249. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 246; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup.
CT. REV. 1; Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on
Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993); Kay P.
Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-On-Student Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205 (1999); Bernice
Resnick Sandier, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, 3 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 49 (1993-1994); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment
and Upholding the First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992);
Horton, supra note 246; Aileen V. Kent, Note, First Amendment Defense to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment: Does Discriminatory Conduct Deserve Constitutional
Protection?, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 513 (1994); Strauss, supra note 196; Eugene Volokh,
Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA. L. REV. 1791 (1992).
250. Among the few articles that address First Amendment issues in the housing
harassment context are Daniel Barkley, Comment, Beyond the Beltway: Fair Housing and
the First Amendment, 6 J. AFF. Hous. & COMM. DEV. 169 (1997) and Schwemm, supra
note 128, at 267-94. Other articles have addressed the First Amendment implications of §
3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory advertising. E.g., Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity andthe
First Amendment: Some Thoughts on All-White Advertising, 61 TENN. L. REV. 289 (1993);
Matthew G. Weber, Media Liability for Publication of Advertising: When to Kill the
Messenger, 68 DENY. U. L. REV. 57 (1991); Mary A. Fiorino, Comment, Advertising for
Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing Real Estate as a Violation of the Fair
Housing Act, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1429 (1988).
251. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 747-48, 751-54; Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 780-83; Schwemm, supra note 128, at 290-93; supra text accompanying notes 35-49.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 274-283.
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compelling state interest" and is "a precisely drawn means" of serving that
interest.2 54 The first part of this test might well be met in a case where the
government's interest is to prevent sexual harassment of women in their
homes, for the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions confirmed that
protecting women from sex discrimination is a governmental interest of the
highest order.255
The difficulty would be that § 3604(c) is not sufficiently narrow or
precisely drawn to achieve this interest. 56 First of all, having § 3604(c)
apply to sexual harassment is not necessary to protect women from many
types of sex discrimination in housing, which is outlawed by other
provisions of the FHA.2"7 Therefore, the precise governmental interest in
adding § 3604(c) to this overall arsenal of anti-sex discrimination
provisions would only extend to those "non-severe or pervasive"
statements of harassment that are not already banned by § 3604(b) or other
FHA prohibitions.258
With respect to this interest, § 3604(c) is hardly a precisely drawn
measure. Apart from the fact that this law also bans six other bases of
discrimination that may well involve different degrees of governmental
interests,259 § 3604(c) covers a variety of types of communications (ads,
254. E.g., Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 540; see also other cased cited supra note
247.
255. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657-58 (2000) (observing
in case involving First Amendment defense to state civil rights statute that "[s]tates have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations"
(citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984))); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395 (described infra
notes 256 and 272); see also Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430,
1439 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("There is no doubt that the prevention of sexual harassment is a
compelling government interest.").
256. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395-96 (striking down ordinance outlawing,
inter alia, gender-based "hate speech" on the ground that, although the government interests
of ensuring "the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been
subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in peace
where they wish . . . are compelling," the ordinance was not "narrowly tailored" to serve
these interests, given the fact that "adequate content-neutral alternatives" existed that would
have achieved "precisely the same beneficial effect").
257. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
258. Cf. HOME, 943 F.2d at 652-53 (deciding that, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, the governmental interest underlying the particular theory of § 3604(c)
liability proposed here is limited to eliminating only those forms of discrimination uniquely
addressed by this theory).
259. For example, it seems likely that, while the high level of governmental interest
in eliminating sex discrimination would be every bit as great with respect to harassment
cases under § 3604(c) involving race, color, religion, and national origin discrimination, it
is at least arguable that a lower level might obtain in cases involving handicap or at least
familial status discrimination. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365-74 (2001) (concluding that the standard of review under Equal Protection Clause is
less demanding for disability discrimination than for racial discrimination based on evidence
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notices, and statements), a number of different housing transactions (sales,
prospective rentals, and, we contend, current rentals), and all such
communications in such transactions that indicate, both intentionally and
unintentionally, any illegal preference, limitation, or discrimination or an
intention to make such a preference, limitation, or discrimination.2 60 A
statute that bans everything from newspaper ads indicating discrimination
with respect to the sale of luxury homes to restrictive covenants in
condominium deeds to landlords' demands for sex from their female
tenants hardly seems the type of narrowly focused statute that would likely
survive the strictest level of scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The second approach to defending the constitutionality of applying §
3604(c) to harassment cases is to identify one or more First Amendment
doctrines that, based on the special context or nature of the speech
involved, would allow the government to place even content-based
restrictions on speech without having to satisfy the highest level of judicial
scrutiny. Likely candidates in the context of applying § 3604(c) to sexually
harassing statements include: the "Fighting Words" doctrine, a variation
of which might allow some restrictions on "Hate Speech"; the
"Commercial Speech" doctrine; and the "Captive Audience" doctrine. We
consider these three doctrines individually in Parts III.B, III.C, and III.D
below, which conclude, respectively, that the "Fighting Words"-"Hate
Speech" doctrine is unlikely to be helpful in protecting § 3604(c) from a
First Amendment challenge, but that the "Commercial Speech" and
"Captive Audience" doctrines do provide a measure of protection.
B. "Fighting Words" and "Hate Speech"
Ever since 1942 when the Supreme Court decided Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,261 the First Amendment has been understood to allow
government to outlaw "fighting words," a narrowly defined category of
speech that is thought to be of such slight social value that any benefit
derived therefrom is outweighed by its costs to public order. 62
Chaplinsky's definition of fighting words-"those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace" 26 -
would at first glance seem to cover some forms of verbal sexual
harassment, particularly those we have called "sexual epithets," 264 which
of state governments' disability discrimination in legislative history of 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act being significantly less than comparable evidence concerning race
discrimination in legislative history of 1965 Voting Rights Act).
260. See supra Parts II.A.2-3.
261. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see also cases cited infra notes 265-66.
262. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
263. Id. at 572.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
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could well be seen as statements "which by their very utterance inflict
injury."
The problem is that in the years since Chaplinsky, the Court has
substantially narrowed the scope of the fighting words doctrine by, inter
alia, holding that the second element of the Chaplinsky test is a necessary,
not just an alternative, part of the definition of fighting words. Thus, the
only types of speech that may be banned under this doctrine are utterances
that not only inflict injury on their targets, 265 but that also "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" by "provok[ing] violent resentment." 266
This requirement that a sexual epithet be so extreme that its utterance
would tend to provoke immediate violence from its target seems to make
the fighting words doctrine an unlikely candidate for protecting § 3604(c)
from First Amendment challenge.
For example, as insulting as were the landlord's statements to his
female tenant in DiCenso267-his calling her a "bitch" and a "whore" from
outside her closed apartment door-it seems unlikely that such statements
would lead to an immediate violent altercation. Indeed, most of the
epithets and other demeaning statements condemned by § 3604(c) would
probably fall within this category; that is, hurtful, but not likely to provoke
a violent response. And this would seem to be particularly so in those
cases where § 3604(c)'s contribution to challenging sexual harassment is
most significant (i.e., where the statements involved are not sufficiently
"severe or pervasive" to alter the terms or conditions of the target's
tenancy) .268
265. Fighting words must be "directed to the person of the hearer." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). While this requirement might result in some group-
based epithets being considered too impersonal to be fighting words, we assume here that
virtually all the sexual epithets that would be covered in § 3604(c) cases (i.e., those directed
to individual female tenants by their landlords) would satisfy this "directed to the person of
the hearer" requirement.
266. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1972); see also Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (holding that speech constituting fighting words must be regarded
by a reasonable addressee as "an invitation to exchange fisticuffs"); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1974) (holding that statute prohibiting the use of "obscene
or opprobrious" language toward police officers was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
encompassed language that "convey[s] disgrace" without inflicting injury or inciting a
breach of the peace); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (holding that the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on
defendant's jacket did not constitute fighting words because it was not directed toward any
particular person and was not likely to provoke a violent reaction from those who saw it).
The Chaplinsky opinion, itself, anticipated this result by ultimately focusing only on whether
the words used there were "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby
cause a breach of the peace." 315 U.S. at 574.
267. 96 F.3d at 1006. See supra text accompanying note 213.
268. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. Another fundamental problem
with trying to use the fighting words doctrine to protect § 3604(c) from a First Amendment
challenge is that this law is written too broadly for a fighting words defense. See, e.g.,
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A variation on the "fighting words" doctrine is to label certain forms
of verbal harassment based on race, sex, and some other protected-class
statuses as "hate speech" and argue that the potential negative
consequences of such speech on its targets are so severe that the
government is justified in banning it. Certainly, there is a wealth of
information about the harms that such hate speech can inflict on its
victims.269 Nevertheless, courts have invariably struck down hate speech
regulations, concluding that the speech they seek to ban, albeit offensive
and even harmful to many who hear it, cannot be considered either fighting
words likely to provoke immediate violence or to be otherwise outside the
protection of the First Amendment. And this is true even where the
challenged regulation is limited to a certain arena, such as student
interactions at a state university,27 or is addressed only to the problems
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524 (striking down as overbroad a statute that, unlike the one upheld
in Chaplinsky, was not limited to words that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed"). The language of §
3604(c) is not limited to banning speech that, by its very utterance, tends to incite violent
reaction by the hearer. Statements are prohibited regardless of to whom they are directed
and regardless of whether they would tend to provoke a violent response. See, e.g., HUD
v. Lewis, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 25,118, at 26,013 (HUD ALI
April 19, 1996) (holding in favor of leasing agent in § 3604(c) claim based on her
employer's instructions to her not to rent to minorities). Thus, even though § 3604(c) may
well ban some statements that are beyond First Amendment protection, the fact that it is
directed against and outlaws many other statements means that it is too broad to be defended
based on the fighting words doctrine. As the Supreme Court has observed:
It matters not that the words [appellant] used might have been constitutionally
prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute. At least when statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and when "no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution," . . . the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity."
Lewis, 415 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-21).
269. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities:
Are First Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?,
39 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1991); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name- Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133, 136-37, 173-74 (1982); Charles H. Jones, Equality, Dignity and Harm: The
Constitutionality of Regulating American Campus Ethnoviolence, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1383
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 436-48, 462-66; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MiCH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Rodney A. Smolla,
Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 171 (1990).
270. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1164-78 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that the First Amendment overrides a state
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created for women by certain explicitly sex-based and offensive
communications. 27
The most important of these decisions is R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,7 2
where the Supreme Court struck down a city's "hate crime" ordinance that
was used to prosecute a juvenile who had burned a cross in front of a
Black family's home.273 R.A. V. is noteworthy in relation to § 3604(c)
university's rule that disciplines students for, inter alia, "racist or discriminatory comments
[and] epithets ... directed at an individual [that] intentionally [d]emean the race [or] sex [of
such] individual [e.g., 'bitch']," which had been adopted in response to a series of incidents
of discriminatory harassment of minorities and women); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down a similarly motivated university hate
speech restriction); see also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich.
1993), aff'd, 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
271. See, e.g., Am. Bookseller Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985). In American Bookseller, the Seventh Circuit invalidated an Indianapolis ordinance
that sought to curb violence and discrimination against women by banning certain forms of
pornography that depicted "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women." Id. at
324. The court accepted "the premises of this legislation"-that is, that depictions of female
subordination might well result in job discrimination, insults, battery, rape, and a myriad of
other "unhappy effects" directed against women. Id. at 329. Nevertheless, because "[t]he
ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech" and because its
prohibitions covered sexual materials that did not qualify as "obscenity" and were therefore
not beyond First Amendment protection on that ground, the Seventh Circuit held it
unconstitutional. Id. at 324-25. In making clear that the potential negative effects of speech
may rarely justify its prohibition outside a few narrowly defined areas such as fighting
words and obscenity, Judge Easterbrook's opinion noted that "[r]acial bigotry, anti-
semitism, [and other expressions of bias are] all ... protected as speech, however
insidious." Id. at 330. The American Booksellers opinion also rejected the government's
argument that the speech prohibited there was not entitled to First Amendment protection
because it was not "answerable" in the "marketplace of ideas." Id. at 330-32. According
to the Seventh Circuit, "the Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a necessary
condition of freedom of speech. . . .The Supreme Court has rejected the position that
speech must be 'effectively answerable' to be protected by the Constitution." Id. at 330-31.
272. 505 U.S. 377. The Court is currently considering another cross-burning case
that presents many of the same First Amendment issues dealt with in R.A. V. See Black v.
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2288 (2002).
273. 505 U.S. at 379-80. St. Paul's "Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance" made it a
misdemeanor to knowingly arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender" by placing a burning cross, Nazi swastika, or other
symbol on public or private property. Id. at 380. The defendant in R.A. V. conceded that
his conduct could have been prosecuted under a properly drawn statute, but he successfully
argued that the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional because it too broadly proscribed
permissible speech and also because it discriminated against certain types of speech. Id.
According to Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by four other members of the Court, the St.
Paul ordinance, being content-based, could be upheld only if it were shown to be reasonably
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Id. at 395-96. The Court held that
St. Paul failed to satisfy this standard, noting that the goals underlying its ordinance could
also be achieved by a law that was "not limited to the favored topics." Id. at 396.
According to Justice Scalia, "the only interest distinctively served by the content limitation
is that of displaying the city council's special hostility toward the particular biases thus
singled out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids." Id. (footnote omitted).
2002:771 Sexual Harassment in Housing and § 3604(c) 827
because the key to the Court's decision was that the challenged ordinance
focused on a defendant's communicative activities rather than his conduct.
Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion made clear his belief that cross burning
was "reprehensible" conduct that government has the responsibility and the
means to prevent in constitutionally appropriate ways.274 According to
R.A. V., however, the proper means were statutes that focused on conduct,
not speech.275
The R.A. V. opinion specifically took note of Title VII's prohibition of
sexual harassment, contrasting it with the St. Paul ordinance and arguing
that Title VII was in no danger of a First Amendment challenge because it
was focused primarily on conduct and therefore only on the "secondary
effects" of speech.276 According to Justice Scalia:
In their concurring opinions, Justices Stevens and Blackmun argued, to the contrary,
that laws based on a special hostility toward racial bias could well be justified under the
First Amendment because of the special harm that flows from such bias. See id. at 416
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring). For his part, Justice
Stevens opined that:
St. Paul's City Council may determine that threats based on the target's race,
religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both the target and to society
than other threats. This ... judgment-that harms caused by racial, religious,
and gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other
fighting words-seems to me eminently reasonable and realistic.
Id.; see also id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 396.
275. Id. at 379-80 & n. I (citing anti-arson and other conduct-based criminal laws in
support of the proposition that the R.A. V. defendant's "conduct could have been punished
under any of a number of laws"); see also United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 824-26
(8th Cir. 1994) (described infra note 283).
276. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389-90. The "secondary effects" doctrine serves to
protect certain types of content-based limitations on speech from First Amendment challenge
based on the realization that speech may "cause secondary effects . . . unrelated to the
[primary] impact of the speech on its audience." City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728, 1739 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (giving as examples billboards
that obstruct views and newspaper factories that cause pollution and noting that such
secondary effects may be regulated "even though they are produced by speech"). The
doctrine has most often been used to uphold municipal efforts to restrict adult bookstores
and movie theaters to certain locations based on the negative impact of these businesses on
local neighborhoods. E.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The
Court has made clear, however, that governmental regulation of the secondary effects of
speech must be "justified without reference to the content of the ... speech." Id. at 48,
quoted with approval in R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389; see also Alameda Books, 122 S. Ct. at
1739 (holding that government "may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by
suppressing the speech itself").
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia relied on the "secondary effects" doctrine to justify his
conclusion that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce a
violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment
practices." 505 U.S. at 389. Because sexual harassment was viewed as a violation of Title
VII's "terms and conditions" provision (that is, a statute aimed at conduct, not speech), it
could be banned without violating the First Amendment, because "[w]here the government
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[S]exually derogatory "fighting words," among others words,
may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibitions
against sexual discrimination in employment practices. Where
the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely
because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.277
One year after R.A. V., the Supreme Court again stressed the
distinction between antidiscrimination laws that focus on conduct and those
that focus on speech in the course of a unanimous opinion that upheld a
sentence-enhancement hate crime law in Wisconsin v. Mitchell."' The
Wisconsin statute challenged in Mitchell provided for longer sentences for
perpetrators of criminal battery who had intentionally selected their victims
on the basis of the victim's "race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry." 27 9 In rejecting the defendant's
claim that this statute violated the principles laid down in R.A. V., Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that "the statute in this case is aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment" in contrast to the "ordinance
struck down in R.A. V. [which] was explicitly directed at expression." 280
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." Id. at 389-90.
The "secondary effects" doctrine could not protect the St. Paul ordinance under review in
R.A. V., however, because it was directed not against the secondary effects, but rather the
primary consequences of cross burning (i.e., the ordinance was designed to protect the
audience's sensibilities). Id. at 394. According to Justice Scalia: "'Listeners' reactions to
speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton. . . . 'The emotive
impact of speech on its audience is not a "secondary effect.""' Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
Presumably, the same distinction would hold true for sexual harassment claims under
the Fair Housing Act. Thus, if such claims were brought under § 3604(b)'s prohibition of
discriminatory terms and conditions, they might well be protected against First Amendment
challenge by the "secondary effects" doctrine as described in R.A. V., whereas claims based
on § 3604(c)-a statute that is explicitly directed against certain types of speech based on its
content and one whose purpose in the sexual harassment context would be to protect against
the primary consequences of the banned speech-would not be able to benefit from this
doctrine.
277. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII's provision
banning discriminatory "terms and conditions"); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991)). In a
concurring opinion joined by four members of the Court, Justice White suggested that the
majority's First Amendment analysis, which he disagreed with, did indeed raise questions
about the constitutionality of Title VII's prohibition of hostile work environment claims
based on sexual harassment. Id. at 409-10 (White, J., concurring).
278. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
279. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990); see Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480.
280. 508 U.S. at 487. The Court in Mitchell did not consider the defendant's
conduct (a physical assault) as "by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct
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Furthermore, according to the Mitchell opinion, the fact that the Wisconsin
statute enhanced the defendant's penalty for "conduct motivated by a
discriminatory point of view" did not render the law unconstitutional.8
The R.A. V. and Mitchell decisions do not bode well for protecting
sexual harassment claims under § 3604(c) from First Amendment
challenge. First of all, this statute, unlike those cited with approval in
those decisions, is specifically directed at statements and other forms of
expression, not conduct, a distinction considered vital in both R.A. V. and
Mitchell.2  The result seems to be that those parts of the FHA aimed at
conduct-such as § 3604(a)'s ban on discriminatory refusals to deal, §
3604(b)'s prohibition of discriminatory terms and conditions, and § 3617's
directive against coercion, interference, and other acts of harassment-
stand in no danger of a First Amendment challenge when applied to sexual
harassment,2 3 but § 3604(c)'s explicit prohibition of discriminatory
statements does.
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 484 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)).
281. Id. at 485-87. According to Mitchell, "motive plays the same role under the
Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which [the
Court has] previously upheld against constitutional challenge." Id. at 487 (citing Roberts,
468 U.S. at 628; Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)). "Title VII ... for example, makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against an employee 'because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
In Hishon, [the Court] rejected the argument that Title VII infringed employers'
First Amendment rights. And more recently, inR.A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at
389-390, [the Court] cited Title VII (as well as 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982) as an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of
conduct.
Id.
282. That § 3604(c) is directed at expression rather than conduct is not changed by
the fact that the statute's ban is couched in terms of certain verbs ("[t]o make, print, or
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published" an offending communication). First
Amendment values would hardly countenance drawing a distinction between a statute that
outlaws "making a statement" and one that simply outlaws the statement. In this regard, it
might be noted that HUD's proposed sex harassment regulation, see supra Part II.B.3, at
times speaks in terms of "verbal conduct" as sufficient to establish hostile environment
harassment, see 65 Fed. Reg. 67,668 (proposed Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500(a)(2), which may be an effort, albeit not a particularly convincing one, to finesse
the speech/conduct distinction that is so important to First Amendment analysis in R.A. V.
and Mitchell.
283. See, e.g., J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 824-26 (affirming convictions of R.A.V. and his
companion for the same cross burning activity that was involved in the R.A. V. case based on
42 U.S.C. § 3631, which is the criminal version of § 3617, on the ground that § 3631,
unlike the St. Paul ordinance in R.A. V., does not violate the First Amendment because it is
directed toward conduct rather than expression); cf. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1226-34,
1237-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment bars this particular § 3617
claim, which was based on defendants' speech and petitioning behavior).
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Furthermore, R.A. V. makes clear that even with respect to speech that
appears to have little or no value in the marketplace of ideas, government
is not free to prohibit only those forms of such speech that involve
particular topics or perspectives. s4 Thus, even if it is assumed that verbal
sexual harassment is valueless speech that could be subjected to extensive
regulation-hardly an obvious assumption for First Amendment
purposes285-the fact that § 3604(c) bans only those statements of
preference, limitation, or discrimination that are based on certain identified
protected classes makes it; in R.A.V.'s terms, "limited to . . . favored
topics," which is "precisely [the type of statute] the First Amendment
forbids. "286
Thus, the governmental interest in protecting women from verbal
harassment, even if it is as weighty as the interest in protecting them from
"hate speech" and "hate crimes," apparently cannot be achieved through
laws, like § 3604(c), that by their terms outlaw a great deal of speech
284. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-96.
285. It seems clear that sexually harassing speech in housing is far removed from
the types of political and religious advocacy about issues of public concern that involve
"core" First Amendment values and that therefore command the highest degree of
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Vill.
of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2002); infra note 78 (discussing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 479 (1988)). It is equally clear, however, that the Supreme Court often accords a
good deal of First Amendment protection to sex-based speech, at least if it falls short of
being obscene under the stringent standards of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403 (2002) (striking down
Congress's ban on simulated child pornography that did not satisfy the Miller standards and
commenting that "[tlhe right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought"). See generally
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech,
71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 752 (1993) (criticizing the entire approach of according reduced
constitutional protection to certain types of allegedly low-value speech on the ground that
"[t]his is exactly the type of argument the First Amendment should foreclose").
With respect to a landlord's sexually harassing statements, such speech could, for
example, express the speaker's deeply-held beliefs about the status of women in society or
the role that sexuality should play in every day life. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (holding that the advocacy of racist and violent beliefs was protected by the
First Amendment in most situations (i.e., except those involving incitement to, and the
likelihood of, imminent lawless action)). Justice Douglas, concurring in Brandenburg,
opined that such protected advocacy originated from the "sanctuary of belief and
conscience." Id. at 457 (Douglas, J., concurring). Nor would such statements necessarily
be considered devoid of expressive content. Cf. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 384-85 ("It is not true
that 'fighting words' have at most a 'de minimis' expressive content, or that their content is
in all respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection'; sometimes they are
quite expressive indeed." (citation omitted)). Thus, while the low value of sexually
harassing speech in housing may well be relevant in determining the degree of First
Amendment protection to which it is entitled, this element alone would be insufficient to
justify its prohibition by § 3604(c).
286. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
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beyond "fighting words." If § 3604(c) is to be applied constitutionally to
sexual harassment, then some other approach must be found to deal with
the potential First Amendment problems that such an application would
raise.
C. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
The high level of judicial scrutiny that generally applies to content-
based restrictions on speech is reduced substantially when the restriction
applies only to commercial activities.2"7 This is due to "the 'commonsense'
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech." 288 Because § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory
statements applies only to those made "with respect to the sale or rental of
a dwelling,"28 9 the speech involved seems likely to be "commercial" and
therefore subject to a lower level of First Amendment protection.
For over twenty years, the test for evaluating the constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech has been the one set forth by the
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquires
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
287. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) ("We have
always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's
core. "' [C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values," and is subject to "modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-commercial expression.'
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("[First Amendment] accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression. "). See generally Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26-33 (2000) (identifying various ways in which commercial speech
receives less First Amendment protection than other types of speech). One of these ways,
which is further discussed infra Part III. E, is that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply in
commercial speech cases. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977).
288. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
455-56).
289. See supra Part II.A.2.
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directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.29
The inquiries called for by this test fall into two groups. The first
deals with whether the speech at issue concerns "lawful activity" and is not
"misleading." The second applies the test's last three factors to determine
if the governmental interest underlying the challenged regulation is
substantial, is directly advanced by the regulation, and could not be served
by less restrictive means. As a practical matter, the constitutionality of a
particular law regulating commercial speech is usually determined by the
first factor; that is, by whether the restricted speech "concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading" or does not. If it does not, there is virtually
no First Amendment protection.29" ' If it does, the regulation is usually
struck down, for the Court has made clear that truthful commercial speech,
albeit less protected than noncommercial speech, is still highly valued in
292
our society.
290. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 566. Recent decisions employing this
test include Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1504, 1509-10 (2002)
(opinions of Justices O'Connor (plurality) and Breyer (dissenting) for a total of eight
Justices); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499-500, 528-29 (1996) (opinions of Justices Stevens and
O'Connor (concurring) for a total of seven Justices).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1993);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973).
292. Indeed, no modern Supreme Court decision has upheld a content-based
restriction on this type of commercial speech, see cases cited infra note 290, although some
have upheld time, place, or manner restrictions on such speech. E.g., Went For It, 515
U.S. 618; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1979); Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447.
The basic rationale for giving a high degree of protection to commercial speech
concerning lawful activity is that, in a market economy, the public has a strong interest in
receiving full and accurate information about the price and availability of all legal products
and services, so that the cumulative effect of consumer decisions will be to distribute the
Nation's resources in the most efficient way. As the Court explained in Central Hudson:
Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information. In applying the First Amendment to this area, we
have rejected the "highly paternalistic" view that government has complete
power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. "[P]eople will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed and ... the best means
to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close
them."
447 U.S. at 561-62 (alteration in original) (quoting Va. St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). Other endorsements of the value of
commercial speech, and therefore of the importance of protecting it under the First
Amendment, are found in Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 184-85, and
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977). The classic
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In determining whether the commercial speech doctrine may be
helpful in § 3604(c) cases involving sexual harassment, three basic issues
must be considered. The first is whether § 3604(c)-outlawed harassing
statements should even be considered "commercial speech" so as to bring
this doctrine into play. Assuming an affirmative answer to this question,
the second issue is whether verbal harassment may be considered outside
First Amendment protection because it concerns unlawful activity or is
misleading. Finally, if the high degree of protection accorded lawful and
nonmisleading commercial speech is considered appropriate, the
determination must be made whether the government's interest in banning
verbal sexual harassment meets the last three elements of the Central
Hudson test.293
With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court has struggled to find
a proper definition of "commercial speech,"294 and the resulting uncertainty
statement of the value of commercial speech was provided by Justice Blackmun in the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case:
Advertising . . . is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So
long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the
proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve
that goal.
425 U.S. at 765 (footnote and citations omitted).
293. Professor Schwemm has dealt with these three issues at some length in a
recent article on § 3604(c). See Schwemm, supra note 128, at 268-82. His conclusions
were that the concept of "commercial speech" covers virtually all § 3604(c)-outlawed
communications, id. at 269-71, that such communications would not concern lawful
activity-and therefore would not be protected by the First Amendment-in all race cases
and all others types of cases except some of those that are subject to the FHA's exemptions,
id. at 273-78, and that for those sex-based and other non-race cases occurring in FHA-
exempt dwellings not subject to a state or local fair housing law, the government would
probably fail to satisfy one or more of the last three elements of the Central Hudson test, so
that § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory communications would be held to violate the First
Amendment (or should be construed in a more narrow way so as not to be unconstitutional).
Id. at 278-82. These conclusions were reached in an article that focused primarily on race-
based cases under § 3604(c) and on statements at the initial stages of a housing sale or rental
as opposed to sex-based cases involving current tenants. These differences are significant
enough to warrant revisiting all three of these issues here.
294. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 420-
23 (1993); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983). See generally
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.29, at 1140-41 (6th
ed. 2000); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15, at 896-99 (2d
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may make for some difficulties in the context of sexual harassment cases
under § 3604(c). The Court has advocated a "commonsense" approach in
determining what is included within the concept of commercial speech,295
and this concept covers not only speech "proposing a commercial
transaction,"296 but also the entire "set of communicative acts about
commercial subjects that conveys information of relevance to [the public's]
decision making."297
This definition would no doubt cover all § 3604(c) cases involving
ads, notices, and statements dealing with housing sales and with the phases
of rentals leading up to an actual tenancy.298 The key time-period for many
sexual harassment cases, however, occurs during the tenancy. Even
assuming that § 3604(c) applies to this time period,299 the question remains
whether a landlord's harassing statement made to a current tenant could be
considered commercial speech when the time has passed for initially
"proposing a commercial transaction." 311
One approach to answering this question is to conclude that all
conversations between a landlord and a tenant are inherently commercial,
because they would not have occurred but for the commercial relationship
between the parties, and thus they always have implications, at least
implicitly, for the terms and conditions of that relationship. As discussed
above,30' virtually all housing harassment takes place either inside the
victim's apartment or elsewhere at the property, which are places of
business for the landlord and his agents. And even if the harassing speech
ed. 1988); Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REV. 693,
765-66 (2002); Post, supra note 287, at 5-25; Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise
Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 80-82, 146 (1999).
295. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56;
supra text accompanying note 288 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 477 U.S. at 562).
According to the Discovery Network opinion, although a "commonsense" distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech does exist, the importance of this
distinction for purposes of First Amendment analysis may well be overestimated and the
difference is simply "a matter of degree." 507 U.S. at 419, 423.
296. Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 562.
297. Post, supra note 287, at 15; see also Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (holding that
informational-advertising pamphlets concerning defendant's prophylactic products are
commercial speech even though they "cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage
in commercial transactions").
298. See, e.g., Racey, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10151, at *3 (holding that landlord's
§ 3604(c)-violative statement to prospective renter that landlord would not rent to blacks was
commercial speech for the purposes of the First Amendment); HOME, 943 F.2d at 651-53
(treating newspaper housing ads challenged under § 3604(c) as commercial speech subject to
the Central Hudson test); New York Times, 923 F.2d at 1002-05 (same). See generally
Schwemm, spra note 128, at 268-82.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
300. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
301. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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doesn't directly concern the terms of a woman's lease, it undoubtedly
affects her experience in renting the dwelling, which is the ongoing
commercial transaction at the heart of her interactions with her landlord.
Even if the proposition that all conversations between a landlord and
tenant are inherently commercial goes too far, we would argue that the
concept of commercial speech should at least apply to all landlord-tenant
conversations where a reasonable person in the tenant's position would
consider the landlord's statements to be related to the terms or conditions
of the rental relationship. In such conversations, the landlord's speech
should be seen as "proposing" a change in the parties' "commercial
transaction." Under this approach, it is clear that some types of verbal
harassment would be covered. One example is what we have called
"sexual requests" (e.g., a demand for sex in exchange for allowing the
tenancy to continue). °2
On the other hand, "sexual epithets" might or might not be reasonably
understood to be effecting a change in the parties' commercial relationship,
depending on the context in which a particular epithet is uttered. For
example, if a landlord directs sexual epithets at a female tenant who has
just rejected his sexual requests, as was done in DiCenso, °3 there would
seem to be a clear connection between the landlord's attempt to change the
terms of the rental relationship and his epithets, which would mean that
they should be considered part of the parties' commercial relationship." 4
If, however, this connection is absent (i.e., the epithet is not prompted by a
discussion of the rental relationship), it would be much harder to argue that
commercial speech is involved.
Similarly, the context would seem to be the key to deciding whether a
landlord's "sexual comments" to a female tenant could be considered
commercial speech. If these comments are explicit enough to suggest to a
reasonable tenant that the landlord is making an implied sexual request, the
terms of the tenancy might well be sufficiently affected to allow the
comments to be considered commercially related; a simple flirtatious
statement, on the other hand, would probably not suffice.3 °5
To the extent verbally harassing statements by a landlord to a tenant
are not considered commercial speech, the usual assumption would be that
302. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
303. See supra note 213.
304. Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985) (assuming that SEC's regulation
of individualized advice attuned to client's particular needs is consistent with First
Amendment, because "communications [that] develop into.., fiduciary, person-to-person
relationships" in a commercial setting may be more heavily regulated than those directed to
the public at large); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-68 (holding that informational pamphlets
concerning defendant's products are commercial speech despite the fact that their advertising
message was linked to a "current public debate").
305. See supra text accompanying notes 206-09.
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a higher standard of First Amendment protection applies. 6 This might
seem odd, given the basic commercial nature of the landlord-tenant
relationship 0 7 and the fact that all of a landlord's harassing statements,
including sexual epithets and sexual comments unrelated to the parties'
commercial relationship, would seem to be of little or no value. Indeed,
the relative value of the speech at issue in commercial and near-
commercial cases has often been considered by the Supreme Court in
reaching its ultimate conclusion concerning the constitutionality of the
restriction involved.3 8 For the moment, however, we leave the issue of the
relative value for First Amendment purposes of sexually harassing
speech 39 and move on to the next phase in the commercial speech analysis,
which is to determine if the particular speech at issue involves unlawful
activity or is misleading so as to fall outside the First Amendment's
protection under the first part of the Central Hudson test.
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court principal decision concerning the
"unlawful" element of the Central Hudson test involved an anti-
discrimination law. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations,310 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a
local employment discrimination ordinance that prohibited newspapers
from carrying "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns.311
In holding that Pittsburgh's anti-discrimination law did not burden
constitutionally protected speech, the Court explained that:
Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it
is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no
306. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(holding that newsletter that utility included with its billing statements is not merely
commercial speech and is therefore entitled to "the full protection of the First Amendment")
(Powell, J., plurality opinion); see also Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 420-24 (implying
that, were the speech at issue here not properly considered commercial, a higher level of
First Amendment protection would apply).
307. See supra text accompanying note 301.
308. E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 9 (holding that utility's monthly
newsletter is entitled to more protection than commercial speech because it "extends well
beyond speech that proposes a business transaction and includes the kind of discussion of
'matters of public concern' that the First Amendment both fully protects and implicitly
encourages") (citations omitted); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459 (holding that specific nature of
the commercial speech here-" [a] lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment [-] is
a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns"); see also Berman,
supra note 294, at 772-82 (arguing that the First Amendment should permit greater
restrictions on certain "lower value" forms of commercial speech, such as tobacco and
gambling advertisements, than on other ads).
309. This topic is discussed in greater detail supra note 258 and accompanying text,
infra note 313 and accompanying text, and infra note 317 and accompanying text.
310. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
311. Id. at 388-89.
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doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the
transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned
"Narcotics for Sale" and "Prostitutes Wanted" rather than stated
within the four corners of the advertisement.312
The rationale for excluding advertisements for illegal activity from
First Amendment protection is that such ads do not provide information
that is needed for the proper functioning of the economic marketplace." 3
Thus, in citing Pittsburgh Press with approval, the Central Hudson opinion
noted that, because "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising, there can be
no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.314
A key factor, therefore, in deciding whether § 3604(c) may be
constitutionally used to challenge verbal harassment is to determine if the
defendant's statement was made with respect to an unlawful activity.
Courts have occasionally been called upon to do this in § 3604(c) cases
involving race and advertising, 3 " but thus far none has done so in a sexual
harassment case involving current tenants.
In conducting our own analysis, we again find it helpful to refer to the
three types of verbal harassment identified in Part II.B. 1. We conclude
that some, but not all, of these forms of harassment would involve illegal
activity or at least be misleading speech. The first type- " sexual requests"
tied to the terms or conditions of tenancy-involves a threat, albeit one that
is not carried out, to engage in quid pro quo harassment. Because such a
statement threatens an activity (e.g., eviction of a tenant who does not
312. Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
313. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
314. 447 U.S. at 563 (citation omitted). See also Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425
U.S. at 772-73 (citing Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376, and Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (a §
3604(c) decision) by way of contrasting the situation in those cases with the situation in
Virginia Board where the transactions proposed in the ads under review were not
"themselves illegal in any way").
315. See HOME, 943 F.2d at 651 n.9 (holding that newspaper housing ads that are
illegally discriminatory "fall outside the ambit of first amendment protection" (citing
Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563-64)); N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d at 1002-03
(holding that the illegality of discriminatory housing ads means that they are outside First
Amendment protection based on the first part of Central Hudson test); see also Racey, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 10151, at *2-3 (holding that landlord's racially discriminatory statement
to black prospect violated § 3604(c) and was commercial speech not protected by the First
Amendment); Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215 (pre-Central Hudson decision holding that newspaper
housing ad made illegal by § 3604(c) is not entitled to First Amendment protection because
of its low commercial value).
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grant the landlord's sexual requests) that would be illegal as a "terms or
conditions" violation of § 3604(b)," 6 the statement relates to an unlawful
activity and thus would fail to qualify for First Amendment protection
under the first part of the Central Hudson test.3 I7 This would be so even if
the landlord knew all along that he did not intend to carry out his threat,
because Central Hudson's first factor eliminates from First Amendment
protection not only speech relating to an illegal activity but also speech that
is false or misleading. 8
"Sexual epithets" and "sexual comments" are more difficult, at least
to the extent they are not tied to an explicit or implied threat to change the
terms or conditions of the parties' rental relationship and therefore would
not run afoul of any other provision of the FHA.319 Since all other FHA
316. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 64 para. 2; cf cases cited supra note 51 (Title
VII).
317. See, e.g., New York Times, 923 F.2d at 1003 (holding that § 3604(c)-violative
newspaper ads relate to discrimination in housing sales and rentals made illegal by the
FHA's § 3604(a) and are therefore illegal commercial speech not protected by the First
Amendment). In a footnote to the majority's opinion in HOME, a Sixth Circuit panel
seemed to suggest that it would be inappropriate, "[w]hen analyzing the constitutional
protections accorded a particular commercial message [challenged under § 3604(c)]," to
look to other provisions of the FHA as a source of illegality, because this would somehow
"circumvent[]" the court's review under Central Hudson. 943 F.2d at 651 n.9. This
position is clearly wrong. As the Second Circuit pointed out in the New York Times case, it
is perfectly appropriate, and not at all circular, to use other FHA provisions in this context;
given Congress's "unquestioned" power to enact such prohibitions, "reliance upon the
statute [referring to the FHA's § 3604(a)] to determine the illegality of ads with a racial
message is not circular but inexorable." 923 F.2d at 1003. The correctness of this position
is underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court's principal case dealing with the "illegal
activity" part of the Central Hudson text involved a civil rights ordinance that, like the
FHA, both outlawed discriminatory conduct and, based on this prohibition, went on to ban
discriminatory advertising. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388, which is cited with
approval as to the "illegal activity" point in both Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 477 U.S.
at 563-64, and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772-73.
318. See supra text accompanying note 290; see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 189, 209-10
(SEC's regulation concerning false or misleading securities advice assumed to be consistent
with the First Amendment). See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 477 U.S. at 563-64
(finding that commercial messages "that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity" or that are "more likely to deceive the public than to inform it" are as unentitled to
First Amendment protection as commercial speech that is "related to illegal activity").
319. We assume here that none of the scores of state and local fair housing laws that
have been certified as substantially equivalent to the FHA, see SCHWEMM, supra note 24, §
24:9 and app. C, contains sex-based prohibitions that go beyond the FHA's. However, to
the extent that such laws do provide additional protection against sexual harassment, they
could provide the basis for a finding of "unlawful activity" under Central Hudson in order
to protect a § 3604(c) claim from First Amendment challenge. See, e.g., Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418 (rejecting First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that barred only
those broadcasters located in states that had not legalized lotteries from airing lottery
advertising).
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prohibitions require a showing of "severe or pervasive" harassment,"' the
only other part of the FHA that could be invoked to make a harassing
statement unlawful would be § 3604(c) itself, but this would amount to a
form of circular reasoning on the "unlawful activity" point that has not
been accepted by the courts.32'
If commercial speech is neither misleading nor relates to an unlawful
activity, the government's ability to ban it is quite limited, extending only
to those situations where the interest underlying the ban is substantial, is
directly advanced by the ban, and could not be served by a more narrowly
tailored restriction.322 As to the first point, there can be little doubt that the
government has a substantial interest in protecting female tenants from
their landlords' verbal harassment.3 23 Also, § 3604(c), as we have
construed it,324 would seem to directly advance this interest by outlawing
all housing-related statements indicating sex-based harassment.3 25 Thus, the
key issue, as it is in most commercial speech cases, would be the
320. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
321. See HOME, where the Sixth Circuit, in narrowly construing § 3604(c) to avoid
a challenge under Central Hudson, opined:
When analyzing the constitutional protections accorded a particular commercial
message, a court starts with the content of the message and not with the label
given the message under the relevant statute. Starting with the language of a
statute would foreclose a court from ever considering the constitutionality of
particular commercial speech because the statute would label such speech illegal
and thus unprotected by the first amendment. Constitutional review by a court
is not so easily circumvented.
943 F.2d at 651 n.9 (citation omitted).
322. See supra text accompanying note 290.
323. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.A.
325. Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 569 (recognizing the
"immediate connection" between a utility's ads and the demand for its product) with Va.
State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 766-70 (holding that a ban on price advertising for
prescription drugs only indirectly serves state's interest in maintaining pharmacists' high
professional standards, which is more directly guaranteed by close enforcement of licensing
regulations).
Although § 3604(c), as we have construed it, would outlaw every harassing statement
that indicates a "preference, limitation, or discrimination ... based on . . sex, " it is
possible to visualize an even more direct attack on the problem of verbal harassment in
housing see, e.g., laws prohibiting various types of "hate speech" that were challenged in
cases cited supra notes 270-72, which means that a court could conceivably hold that §
3604(c) fails even the "directly advance" part of the Central Hudson test. Still, it seems
unnecessary to dwell at length on this issue, because all modern Supreme Court decisions
according First Amendment protection to commercial speech have relied on Central
Hudson's final factor, regardless of whether the "directly advance" factor was considered a
problem.
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application of Central Hudson's final factor 326-specifically, determining
whether § 3604(c) is likely to be considered a more extensive ban on
speech than is needed to serve this interest.
This final factor requires that there be "a reasonable fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a
means narrowly tailored to achieved the desired objective."3 27 While the
government need not meet a "least restrictive means" standard, 328 it must
have "'carefully calculated' the costs and benefits associated with the
burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. ,329
In applying these standards to § 3604(c)'s ban on verbal harassment, it
must be conceded that the statute is a broadly drafted prohibition of
discriminatory speech, 330 and that there is little evidence that Congress
focused on, must less "carefully calculated," the pros and cons of limiting
landlord-tenant harassment when it enacted either the original version of §
3604(c) or its later inclusion of sex-based discriminatory statements. 331 It is
clear, therefore, that § 3604(c) was not consciously tailored to narrowly
address verbal harassment in rental situations. Thus, for example,
Congress could have, but has not, limited § 3604(c)'s applicability to sex-
based statements that do not amount to "severe or pervasive" harassment to
those situations where the "very utterance" of the statement is likely to
"inflict injury" on the individual to whom it is directed and thereby
disrupts that person's "full [and] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling. 0332
On the other hand, there is evidence in some Supreme Court decisions
that the government's position is viewed more favorably when it is
regulating person-to-person commercial speech, particularly between
parties in an unequal bargaining relationship. For example, in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n,333 the Court, in upholding a disciplinary rule barring
lawyers from soliciting clients in person, drew a distinction between this
practice and lawyer advertising to the general public,334 which a year
326. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 561-70; Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 188-95; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504-08, 529-34; Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 568-71.
327. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556 (alternations in original) (quoting Went For
It, 515 U.S. at 632).
328. Id.
329. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417, quoted with approval in Lorillard
Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 561.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 247 and 256-60.
331. See supra text accompanying note 194.
332. The quoted language is a combination of the "fighting words" doctrine, see
supra note 263 and accompanying text, and FHA provisions dealing with special protections
for disabled persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), (B).
333. 436 U.S. 447.
334. Id. at 448-49.
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earlier had been held to warrant First Amendment protection in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona."' The difference, according to Ohralik, lay in the
greater danger that in-person solicitation posed.336 The Court recognized
that in-person solicitation by lawyers has long been viewed "as posing a
significant potential for harm to the prospective client."337 Unlike lawyer
ads directed to the general public, "in-person solicitation may exert
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an
opportunity for comparison or reflection. "338 Ohralik noted that the evils of
such solicitation included "potential harm to the solicited client" and that
among the government's compelling reasons for restricting this practice
were "to protect the privacy of individuals" and to prevent "undue
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct. "339
The Ohralik opinion also noted that a lawyer who engages in in-
person solicitation and his prospective client participate in this conversation
on unequal terms.3 40 According to Ohralik:
[T]he potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally
solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person ....
Although it is argued that personal solicitation is valuable
because it may apprise a victim of misfortune of his legal rights,
the very plight of that person not only makes him more
335. 433 U.S. at 382-83.
336. According to the Ohralik opinion, "Bates does not predetermine the outcome in
this case. The entitlement of in-person solicitation of clients to the protection of the First
Amendment differs from that of the kind of advertising approved in Bates, as does the
strength of the State's countervailing interest in prohibition." 436 U.S. at 455; see also infra
note 343 and accompanying text.
337. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
338. Id. at 457. In a footnote supporting the observation quoted in the text, the
Court noted that "[tihe immediacy of a particular communication and the imminence of
harm are factors that have made certain communications less protected than others." Id. at
457 n.13. The cases cited in support of this latter comment, Cohen, 403 U.S. 15, and
Chaplinski, 315 U.S. 568, dealt with "fighting words," and their citation here suggests that
the Court feels it is appropriate to consider the factors involved in such cases even if that
doctrine itself would, as in Ohralik, clearly not apply. This approach of considering
"fighting words" factors in evaluating a First Amendment defense in a commercial speech
case could well be useful in determining § 3604(c)'s constitutionality in verbal harassment
cases.
339. 436 U.S. at 461-62. see also Went For It, 515 U.S. at 624, 630 (upholding
state bar's 30-day restriction on direct-mail solicitations to accident victims on the ground
that the bar's "interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims
and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers" is substantially
greater in this targeted solicitation situation than it would be if "an untargeted letter mailed
to society at large" were involved).
340. 436 U.S. at 465.
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vulnerable to influence but also may make advice all the more
intrusive. "'
Indeed, the Court held that this risk meant that a state may "presume
that in-person solicitation by lawyers more often than not will be injurious
to the person solicited."342 The Court also rejected Ohralik's argument that
his particular solicitation could not be constitutionally sanctioned without a
showing that it had indeed caused harm to a prospective client, noting that
the state's adoption of a prophylactic rule was justified in part because of
the likely difficulties in proving such individual harm: "Unlike the
advertising in Bates, in-person solicitation is not visible or otherwise open
to public scrutiny. Often there is no witness other than the lawyer and the
lay person whom he has solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to
obtain reliable proof of what actually took place. 3 43
Virtually all of the reasons mentioned in Ohralik for justifying the
government's restriction of commercial speech-including protecting the
target of the speech from invasion of privacy, intimidation, and other
vexatious conduct; guarding against such a sense of immediacy that the
target of the speech lacks a reasonable opportunity for reflection on its
merits; the inherently unequal relationship between the parties; and the
difficulties of proving actual harm based on one-on-one conversations-are
also likely to be present in § 3604(c) harassment cases. 3 4 Indeed, the
341. Id. (footnotes omitted).
342. Id. at 466.
343. Id. Similar themes regarding the potential dangers of person-to-person
commercial speech were sounded in Lowe, 472 U.S. 181. There, the Court cited Ohralik in
distinguishing between the high degree of First Amendment protection that would be
accorded an investment newsletter directed to the public and the type of "person-to-person
communication in a commercial setting [that] may be subjected to regulation" consistent
with the First Amendment. Id. at 189. In Lowe, the Court construed an exemption in the
federal law regulating investment advisors to include a publisher of a publicly distributed
newsletter, primarily because it felt that to subject such a publication to the statute would
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 210. The Court made clear, however, that Congress did
intend to, and could constitutionally, regulate personalized investment advice. Id.
According to Lowe:
The dangers of fraud, deception, or overreaching that motivated the enactment
of the statute are present in personalized communications but are not replicated
in publications that are advertised and sold in an open market.
Id. Thus, the particular newsletter at issue in Lowe was protected, but only "[a]s long as the
communications between petitioners and their subscribers remain entirely impersonal and do
not develop into the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relationships" that were of concern
to Congress. Id.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95. In addition, Ohralik's comment that
the speech restricted there "is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns," 436 U.S. at 459, could also be said about harassing statements violative of §
3604(c). See also supra note 285 and accompanying text and infra note 349 and
accompanying text.
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potential harms may well be greater in the housing harassment situation,
for the primary danger to the target of the speech in Ohralik (i.e., a
prospective legal client with a civil claim who is solicited personally) is the
less immediate, primarily financial one of hiring a non-optimal lawyer.345
Still, even if it is accepted that serious problems justify § 3604(c)'s
ban of verbal harassment, the fact that this statute is not narrowly drafted
to deal with this set of problems remains a possible stumbling block for
purposes of applying Central Hudson's final factor. Furthermore, the
restriction on speech upheld in Ohralik was both written and justified based
on the manner of the speech involved there, whereas § 3604(c) focuses on
a statement's content, not the time, place, or manner of its delivery. 46
Thus, it must be said that the fact that § 3604(c) could have been written in
a more focused, less speech-restrictive way leaves real doubts, even after
Ohralik, about whether this law could satisfy the last part of the Central
Hudson test in all verbal harassment cases.347
We conclude this section not only with some uncertainty as to §
3604(c)'s constitutionality in harassment cases, but also by recognizing that
much of the commercial speech doctrine seems not to fit well as a method
for assessing the proper level of First Amendment protection to be
accorded a landlord's sexual requests, epithets, and comments to a female
tenant. Here, unlike the classic commercial speech case, the government's
primary concern is not likely to be preventing commercial harms to the
tenant.34 Indeed, were only traditional commercial speech concerns
345. Ohralik, 447 U.S. at 461.
346. See supra text accompanying note 247. This distinction between content-based
and time-place-manner restrictions on speech is not only a matter of high significance in
First Amendment cases generally, see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 275-80, but has been
specifically noted as a crucial factor affecting the standard of review in commercial speech
cases. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428-3 1; see also cases cited supra note
292 para. 1. Furthermore, while it might well be assumed that most § 3604(c)-violative
harassment occurs in or near the victim's home, the statute is not written so as to limit its
ban of discriminatory statements only to those occurring in certain places. See 42 U.S.C. §
3604(c).
347. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 290; see also supra note 282-86 and
accompanying text, see also Schwemm, supra note 128, at 278-82 (concluding that Central
Hudson's final factors would generally favor housing providers who make truthful, non-
illegal statements in violation of § 3604(c)). But see Racey, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10151,
at *3 (holding that Central Hudson's concluding factors favor § 3604(c) over landlord's
First Amendment right to make racially discriminatory statement to black prospect).
348. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426 (noting that government's
"interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed ... is,
of course, the typical reason" given for restricting commercial speech); see also supra note
292.
This is not always true, however. Indeed, there are cases in which governmental
restrictions on commercial speech have been successfully defended on grounds having to do
not with commercial harms but with protecting the personal privacy of the speech's targeted
audience. See infra notes 388-98 and accompanying text.
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involved, it could well be argued that all unwelcome sex-based speech by a
landlord to a tenant should be unprotected because it has virtually no value
in the proper working of the marketplace for housing,349 which is the
underlying rationale for according First Amendment protection to
commercial speech,35° and because it is so harmful to the target's
enjoyment of her home. While this may be true, it points more to the fact
that such verbal harassment is harmful because of where it takes place and
because of the relationship between the parties, rather than because it
involves commercial information about the price and availability of goods
and services in the marketplace. Seen in this light, the problem of
statements that amount to housing harassment should be addressed under a
First Amendment doctrine that deals more directly with the actual
governmental interests involved than does the "commercial speech"
doctrine. Such an alternative doctrine-the one involving limits on speech
directed to a "captive audience" in their homes-is considered in the next
Section.
D. The Captive Audience Doctrine
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a "significant
difference between state restrictions on a speaker's right to address a
willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted
communication. "35' This so-called "captive audience doctrine" could prove
to be a significant source of protection for § 3604(c) harassment claims
from First Amendment challenge.
The doctrine holds that the government has greater authority to restrict
speech that is directed at unwilling listeners who are "practically helpless"
to avoid it.352 In such situations, the individual's right to privacy can trump
the speaker's right to be heard. Thus, the captive audience doctrine creates
349. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563-64 (finding that
commercial messages "that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity" are
entitled to no more First Amendment protection that those that are deceitful or related to
illegal activity).
350. See supra note 292, para. 2.
351. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (2000).
352. The doctrine was first articulated in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949),
where the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance the prohibited the use of sound amplification
devices on public streets, stating that, "[t]o enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the
rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself." Id. at 88. Numerous Supreme
Court cases have since recognized the doctrine. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-18; Frisby,
487 U.S. at 487; Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 & n.ll; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); id. at 306 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-
38 (1970).
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a narrow exception to the general principle that the government cannot
prohibit speech simply because it offends or upsets the listener. 3
One of the key concepts at work in this doctrine is the notion of
"captivity." The listener is seldom literally captive to speech-indeed,
there is virtually always something that one could do to avoid hearing or
seeing an unwanted message.354 The question, then, becomes a normative
one: in what contexts do we believe that a listener should not have to be
confronted with unwanted speech, and should not have to assume the
burden of avoiding it? Although the captive audience doctrine has
occasionally been applied in non-residential settings,355 the Supreme Court
353. The principle has been expressed both in terms of a particular listener's desire
not to hear the speech and of a general societal dislike of the speech. See, e.g., United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (quoting Johnson,
491 U.S. at 414)); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) ("'[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense,
that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection."' (quoting Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745));
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910 ("Speech does not lose its protected character...
simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.").
354. See, e.g., Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210-11 (striking down a ban on the
exhibition of nudity on the screens of drive-in movie theaters because offended passers-by
could simply not look at the screen); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (reversing defendant's
conviction for disturbing the peace, where the "disturbance" consisted of wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse, because those inside the courthouse
could avert their eyes to avoid the message); see also Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive
Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 89-91 (1991),
355. E.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (applying captive audience doctrine to statute
regulating speech outside health care facilities and noting that "[t]his Court has considered
analogous issues-pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights
of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a variety of contexts" (alternations in
original)); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-04 (plurality opinion) (subway riders held to be captive
to the messages placarded on the inside of subway cars); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
470-71 (1980) (noting that laws may constitutionally protect persons from boisterous and
threatening speech in certain places, in addition to their homes, "that require peace and quiet
to carry out their functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals" (quoting
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
Lower courts have also applied the captive audience doctrine to settings outside of the
home, most often in Title VII harassment cases. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535-36 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (female employees were
captive audience to sexual comments and pictures at work); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 871-73 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (upholding
injunction which prohibited manager from using particular racial epithets to Hispanic
employees, in part because the employees were "captive" at work), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1138 (2000); cf Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (college teacher had
no ,First Amendment right to use profane and abusive language in the classroom where his
students were an unwilling and captive audience). The cases, however, are few, and there is
no consensus as to whether employees should be considered "captive" to speech occurring at
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has been particularly diligent in applying it in cases involving
communicative intrusions into a listener's home.35 6 The rationale is that,
while people assume the risk of being confronted with unwanted speech
whenever they go out into the world, they are entitled to at least one place
(i.e., their home) to which they can retreat to enjoy privacy, repose, and
control over their environment. 3" The government's interest in protecting
unwilling listeners from speech in this one place is, therefore,
substantial.358
their workplaces. The Robinson court argued that the level of coercion present in employer-
employee relations was significant enough to justify protecting employees from harassing
speech. 760 F. Supp. at 1535 ("Few audiences are more captive than the average worker."
(quoting J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (internal quotations omitted))). Justice
Thomas dissented to the denial of certiorari in Aguilar, arguing that the case presented
serious First Amendment problems because the injunction- which actually listed words that
the manager was not to utter at work-amounted to a prior restraint. 529 U.S. at
1141(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas recognized the validity of the captive
audience doctrine in some contexts, but questioned whether the doctrine should be applied to
the broad category of workplace speech. Id. Commentators have generally been skeptical
about applying the captive audience doctrine to the workplace as a way of shielding Title VII
harassment claims from First Amendment challenge. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The
Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 709-10 (1995) (quoting Volokh, supra note 249, at 1832-33;
KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF
SPEECH 86 (1995)); Jules B. Gerard, supra note 249, at 1030-32. But see Strauss, supra
note 196, at 35-37 (noting that an employee at work may qualify for captive audience status,
particularly if a communication is directed to her in a way that she cannot avoid hearing or
seeing it).
356. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85 (described infra notes 359-64 and
accompanying text); Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 & n. 11 (recognizing "the special
privacy interests that attach to persons who seek seclusion within their own homes");
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 ("Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where
the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder."); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 ("Such selective [speech] restrictions have been
upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home."); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21
-22 ("[T]his Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to
prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot
be totally banned from the public dialogue."); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 ("The ancient
concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost
none of it vitality, and none of the recognized exceptions includes any right to communicate
offensively with another."). See also Gerard, supra note 249, at 1031.
357. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 ("[While] it may be that one has a more substantial
claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through a courthouse corridor than,
for example, strolling through Central Park, surely there is nothing like the interest in being
free from unwanted expression in the confines of one's own home.").
358. See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 ("Preserving the sanctity of the home, the
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily
pursuits, is surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the
right of an individual 'to be let alone' in the privacy of the home, 'sometimes the last citadel
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One of the leading cases involving this doctrine is Frisby v. Schultz,359
where the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to an ordinance that
banned picketing targeted at an individual residence.36 Speaking for the
Court in Frisby, Justice O'Connor wrote:
Our prior decisions have often remarked on the unique
nature of the home . . . and have recognized that "[p]reserving
the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and
women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily
pursuits, is surely an important value."
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of
the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect
individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the
home is different. "That we are often 'captives' outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech...
does not mean we must be captives everywhere." Instead, a
special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own
walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to
avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals
are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own
homes and that the government may protect this freedom ....
We have "never intimated that the visitor could insert a foot in
the door and insist on a hearing." There simply is no right to
force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.36" '
These sentiments bode well for protecting § 3604(c)'s ban on housing
harassment from a First Amendment challenge. As discussed above,
housing harassment is particularly damaging precisely because it affects a
woman's sense of security in her home, a place that should function as a
special area of repose and privacy,362 and where, according to Frisby, all
citizens have a right to be protected from unwanted intrusions.363
Commenting on the nature of targeted residential picketing in Frisby, the
Court noted that this type of speech has a "devastating effect ... on the
quiet enjoyment of the home": "To those inside . . . the home becomes
of the tired, the weary, and the sick.' The State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
society.") (citations omitted).
359. 487 U.S. 474.
360. The stated purpose of the ordinance in Frisby was "'the protection and
preservation of the home' through assurance 'that members of the community enjoy in their
homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy."' Id. at 477.
361. Id. at 484-85 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
362. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
363. See supra text accompanying note 361.
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something less than a home when and while the picketing ... continue[s].
... [The] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but
they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly
domestic tranquility." 64 Surely, sexual harassment in housing would have
no less dire consequences for its targets than those identified in Frisby for
the victims of targeted residential picketing.365
The captive audience doctrine's focus on the physical location of the
listener requires that, for it to apply, the woman must be at home. As a
practical matter, this should not serve to significantly limit the housing
harassment cases in which the doctrine can be used. Although it is
theoretically possible for housing harassment to take place somewhere
other than at the victim's dwelling (e.g., a landlord, during an encounter
with a tenant at the local grocery store, requests that she have sex with him
that month in lieu of rent), in virtually all of the reported housing
harassment cases that mention the location of the harassment it occurred
either inside the victim's apartment, just outside the door, or elsewhere on
the grounds or in the building.366
Another important aspect of the captive audience doctrine is that it
provides some support for upholding even content-based restrictions on
speech such as § 3604(c). This is because a court must frequently look to
the content of the speech in order to classify the listener as unwilling to
receive it.367 For example, despite the Frisby Court's characterization of
the challenged ordinance there as content neutral,368 it described the speech
involved in content-based terms, noting that "[tjhe First Amendment
364. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)) (alteration in original).
365. See Cahan, supra note 3, at 1073-74 (noting that typical reactions of housing
harassment victims include feelings of nervousness, frustration, fear, and anger, which can
manifest themselves in physical illness, decreased work productivity, and depression).
366. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d 1004 (harassment occurred in victim's doorway);
Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (harassment occurred inside victim's apartment); Williams, 955
F. Supp. 490 (harassment occurred in laundry room, elevator, and hallway); Kogut, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) at 25,904 (harassment occurred inside victim's
apartment); cf. Krueger, 115 F.3d 487 (harassment occurred during rental interview and at
lease-signing, and later occurred inside victim's apartment and in the stairwell); Abrams,
694 F. Supp. 1101 (described supra note 137).
367. See Strauss, supra note 354, at 105; see also, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 720
(recognizing that "the content of the oral statements made by an approaching speaker must
sometimes be examined to determine" if the statute at issue here applies); Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. at 747-48 (holding that government has the authority to limit the context in which
a public broadcast containing "vulgar, offensive, and shocking" language aired); Lehman,
418 U.S. 298 (upholding municipal policy prohibiting political advertisements in subway
cars); Rowan, 397 U.S. 728 (allowing residents to block sexually oriented mail from being
delivered to their homes); cf. Frisby, 487 U.S. 474 (discussed infra text accompanying notes
359-64).
368. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481-82.
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permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the
'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech." 369 The Frisby
opinion went on to assume that the individual who was the target of the
focused residential picketing (a doctor who performed abortions) was
"presumptively unwilling" to receive the speech being directed at him
(protests by anti-abortion activists).37 Presumably, the Court would not
have made this assumption if the picketers were instead members of a pro-
choice group holding a supportive rally outside the doctor's house.37'
Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,372 the Court, in upholding a
federal restriction on radio broadcasting of "indecent" language,
recognized that the "vulgar, offensive, and shocking" nature of the speech
involved was precisely what made it necessary for unsuspecting radio
listeners to be shielded from it.
373
This approach may at first glance seem to conflict with R.A. V. and
other cases discussed in Part III. B that bar the government from prohibiting
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive.374
Indeed, as a matter of basic First Amendment values, the fact that speech
may be offensive to the majority of the populace is the very reason that
such speech needs and commands constitutional protection. 37" The Supreme
Court has resolved this apparent conflict, however, by noting that once
certain types of vulgar and offensive speech have been inflicted on the
unwilling listener, the damage is done regardless of the listener's ability to
subsequently shut out the speech. As the Court noted in Pacifica
Foundation:
369. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
370. Id. at 488.
371. In American Coalition of Life Activists, the Ninth Circuit held that similar use
of context to determine whether facially non-threatening speech should in fact be considered
threatening did not result in viewpoint discrimination. 290 F.3d 1058 at 1078-79. In that
case, the speech at issue consisted of "Wanted" posters and Internet sites that focused on
doctors who provided abortions. Id. at 1080. The context was an intimidating atmosphere
created by acts of violence against clinics and abortion providers, carried out entirely by
people opposed to abortion. Id. at 1079-80. Furthermore, the court determined that,
because the statute being enforced was viewpoint neutral (prohibiting violence and
obstructive activity at any clinic providing reproductive services, not just those that perform
abortions) and the speakers were being punished for the threats and not their viewpoint, the
approach was permissible. Id. at 1071-86.
372. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 747-49.
373. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aguilar, 980 P.2d 846
(upholding injunction which prohibited manager from using particular racial epithets to
Hispanic employees).
374. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text (discussing R.A. V., 505 U.S.
377); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
375. See supra note 353.
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To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One
may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not
give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has
already taken place.376
In the housing context, of course, the target of sexual harassment is
unlikely to have a means of shielding herself from the harassing speech of
her landlord or property manager in the first place, due to the high degree
of access that these individuals have to their victims.377 Because the Court
recognizes that some types of speech, by nature of their content, can be
prevented from intruding into the homes of unwilling listeners, it follows
that § 3604(c)'s content-based ban on certain housing-related statements
should not be seen as automatically conflicting with the First Amendment,
at least in those cases where the prohibited speech amounts to harassment
forced on an unwilling tenant in or near her home. Moreover, as Frisby
made clear, where the intruding speech is directed solely at an individual
rather than the general public, even "core" First Amendment speech like
picketing is less worthy of protection, and the government's ability to
restrict it is correspondingly stronger.378
The only reason that Frisby and other "captive-audience-in-the-home"
cases are not a total defense of § 3604(c)'s constitutionality in sexual
harassment situations occurring in or near the target's home is that the
captive-audience cases invariably involve laws that, by their terms, focus
on the place of the offending speech and therefore are treated by the Court
as time-place-manner restrictions entitled to a more generous standard of
review than content-based statutes like § 3604(c). 37 9 As Frisby itself pointed
376. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49.
377. See supra note 365 and accompanying text. The notion of "captivity" is
particularly powerful in the case of housing harassment, because it is so likely to affect low-
income women who have little ability to change their housing situations. See supra note 92
and accompanying text.
378. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479, 486 (noting that, while the First Amendment
protects the flow of information to the public and the anti-picketing ordinance "operates at
the core of the First Amendment," the picketers whose speech was restricted "do not seek to
disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident ... in
an especially offensive way"); see also supra notes 310-12, 340-43 and accompanying text;
cf. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F. 3d at 1072-80 (concluding that intimidating speech
that was specifically and personally targeted to particular individuals was more threatening
and therefore less deserving of First Amendment protection).
379. Compare Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-25 (determining that challenged statute is a
content-neutral time-place-manner restriction which triggers lighter standard of review), and
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481-82 (same), with Carey, 447 U.S. at 460-63 (holding that residential
picketing restriction is subject to higher level of scrutiny because it is content-based). But
see supra text accompanying notes 372-73 (discussing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726).
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out, "the appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute
distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of
content. 380 Having determined that the ordinance was properly
characterized as "content neutral," the Court proceeded to apply a First
Amendment standard that is substantially more generous to the government
than would be appropriate in content-based cases.38'
Unlike the ordinance in Frisby, § 3604(c) is by its terms directed
against certain types of housing-related statements based on their content.382
Furthermore, the governmental interest underlying § 3604(c)'s ban on
verbally harassing statements would be to protect against the harms that
such statements cause because of their content, not because of the time,
place, or manner of their utterance. 383 This latter point, which is crucial in
the Supreme Court's determination of how to evaluate a "mixed"
content/time-place-manner restriction on speech,384 is reflected in the fact
380. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481-82.
381. Id.; see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-25. The standard articulated in Frisby for
content-neutral restrictions on speech is "whether the ordinance is 'narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest' and whether it 'leave[s] open ample alternative
channels of communication."' Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482 (alteration in original) (quoting
Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); accord Hill,
530 U.S. at 725-26. For an example of the higher level of scrutiny that applies in captive
audience cases where the challenged law is perceived as content-based, see Carey, 447 U.S.
at 461-62 (striking down anti-residential picketing ordinance that exempted labor picketing).
See also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-86.
In Carey, the Court was at pains to point out that its ruling striking down the
discriminatory ordinance was not to be understood to prevent government from subjecting
residential picketing to "uniform and nondiscriminatory regulation." 447 U.S. at 470.
According to the Carey opinion:
[N]o mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units
powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boisterous and
threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people.
• . for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of the outside business
and political world.
Id. at 470-71 (quoting Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118 (Black, J., concurring)). Indeed, Carey
went so far as to conclude that "certain state interests may be so compelling that where no
adequate alternatives exist a content-based distinction-if narrowly drawn-would be a
permissible way of furthering those objectives." Id. at 465. Although Carey assumed that
the state's interest in protecting residential privacy was especially compelling, it concluded
that the statute's allowance of labor picketing fatally undercut this position by showing that
the state "itself has determined that residential privacy is not a transcendent objective." Id.
A different conclusion might well be appropriate, Carey indicated, concerning a statute, like
§ 3604(c), that includes no exemptions. Id. at 470; see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 720-23
(upholding speech-restricting statute based on captive-audience doctrine and distinguishing
Carey on the ground that the statute in Hill included no exemptions).
382. See supra text accompanying note 247.
383. See generally Schwemm, supra note 128, at 249-51 (identifying purposes that
have been recognized as underlying § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory statements).
384. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-25; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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that § 3604(c) is written so as to apply even to harassing statements made
away from the victim's dwelling and, in addition, to housing ads and
notices that are made in newspapers and all other places.385
Thus, it is clear that a First Amendment challenge to § 3604(c) would
have to evaluate this statute under a more rigorous standard, based on its
lack of content neutrality, than was applied in Frisby. It follows,
therefore, that, although some language in captive-audience opinions may
be of great value for purposes of defending § 3604(c)'s constitutionality in
the context of sexual harassment cases, the actual holdings of those cases
would not be conclusive on this issue. Still, because the captive audience
cases have upheld restrictions on even "core" First Amendment speech
where the speaker "has legitimate and important [constitutional]
concerns" 386 and have done so by concluding that the challenged law
"reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected rights
of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners," 387 they
provide at least a strong underpinning for supporting § 3604(c)'s ban of
such low-value speech as housing-related harassing statements.
Further support can also be found in a few "hybrid" cases, which
justify governmental restrictions on commercial speech on grounds having
to do with protecting the personal privacy of the speech's captive audience.
For example, in Went For It,388 the Supreme Court upheld bar rules
creating a 30-day blackout period after an accident during which lawyers
were prohibited from soliciting accident victims, 389 because the bar's
"interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims
and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers" 390
was determined to satisfy the requirements of Central Hudson.39' A crucial
part of the Court's analysis in Went For It was its recognition of the state's
overriding "interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home"'3 92 and the home's special role as a place to "avoid intrusion,"
"which the State may legislate to protect. 9393
385. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428-31 (rejecting government's
argument that its anti-newsrack ordinance was merely a time-place-manner restriction
because the ordinance was not limited in a way that would support a governmental interest
based on time, place, or manner as opposed to content).
386. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714. See also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479, 486 (described supra
note 378).
387. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714.
388. 515 U.S. 618.
389. Id. at 620.
390. Id. at 624.
391. Id at 635.
392. Id. at 625 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471) (discussed infra note 358).
393. Id. (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85 (discussed supra in the text
accompanying 359-64).
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Another case that deals with the intersection of the commercial speech
and captive audience doctrines is Anderson v. Treadwell,394 where the
Second Circuit relied on Went For It and Frisby in holding that New
York's ban on realtors' solicitation of home listings in certain designated
areas satisfied the Central Hudson test.395 The ban was part of an effort to
curtail the practice of "blockbusting," which violated the state's fair
housing law, and was defended on the basis of both the state's interest "in
protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting" and its interest "in protecting
the privacy of homeowners from harassing in-home real estate
solicitations."3 96 The Second Circuit chose to focus only on the latter,
sustaining the ban "solely on the homeowners' privacy interest" and citing
Went For It, Frisby, and other Supreme Court decisions acknowledging the
importance of this interest.397 The Anderson opinion pointed to evidence
that "homeowners feel harassed by the amount and the intensity of the
solicitations," and held that the ban satisfied Central Hudson's "reasonable
fit" requirement because, by relying on a "resident-activated" system to
identify those targets who could no longer be solicited, the New York
scheme "is precisely co-extensive with those who are experiencing the
particular harm. ' 398 Certainly, at least as much could be said for §
3604(c)'s ban on sexually harassing statements, which, because they would
only be actionable if found to be unwelcome by their target and also
offensive to a reasonable person, would surely be seen as no less intrusive
than the real estate solicitations in Anderson. By viewing a commercial
speech case with fair housing implications through the lens of the special
interest that government has in protecting homeowner privacy, Anderson
acknowledges the connection between the doctrines we discuss in Part III.B
and III.C and thereby establishes a precedent for unifying these doctrines
to provide an even more powerful defense of § 3604(c)'s constitutionality
in sexual harassment cases than their separate discussion might suggest.399
E. Final Considerations
In the preceding Sections of Part III, we have shown that § 3604(c)
may be applied to many, if not all, cases of verbal harassment without
violating the First Amendment. Although the statute is explicitly directed
against certain "statements" based on their content and such statements
394. 294 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2002).
395. Id. at 461.
396. Id.
397. Id. (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc 'y of N. Y., 122 S. Ct. 2080; Went For
It, 513 U.S. at 625; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85).
398. Id. at 462.
399. See id.
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would rarely constitute unprotected "fighting words," the commercial
context of most of these statements, the captive nature of the targets of
such statements, the extremely sensitive location where most such
statements would occur, and the marginal value of sexually harassing
speech mean that the level of First Amendment protection that should be
accorded the types of harassing statements condemned by § 3604(c) would
be low.
When a speech-restricting statute is challenged on First Amendment
grounds, the challenge is brought against the restriction either "on its face"
or "as applied."40 A facial challenge contends that the statute at issue
intrudes so heavily into speech protected by the First Amendment that it
cannot be upheld regardless of the particular facts that might gave rise to
the individual speaker's prosecution.4 ' Facial challenges often focus on
the precise wording of the law under review (e.g., to determine if it is
sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to withstand constitutional challenge) and
often consider whether the law, although possibly capable of constitutional
application in certain circumstances, is not overly broad with respect to its
restriction of speech in other potential applications.4 2 Because § 3604(c)'s
ban of verbally harassing statements would not be unconstitutional in the
vast majority of cases, a facial challenge should certainly fail.403
A concept related to facial unconstitutionality is the "overbreadth
doctrine," which allows a statute to be struck down if, despite the fact that
it applies to unprotected speech in the particular case presented, it is
written so broadly that it may also cover substantial amounts of speech
protected by the First Amendment.40 4 The evil of an overbroad statute is
that it may unduly chill the First Amendment rights of others not before the
court.40 5 As the Supreme Court recently noted: "[T]he overbreadth
doctrine enables litigants 'to challenge a statute not because their own
rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction
or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression. ""406
400. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 708 (facial challenge); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476
(same); Carey, 447 U.S. at 458 (both facial and as applied challenges); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
462-68 (as applied challenge).
401. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 & n.20; Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-21.
402. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-32; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485-88.
403. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476, 488 (rejecting facial challenge to
ordinance).
404. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 731-32.
405. Id.
406. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)); see also
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 n.20 (explaining that, under the overbreadth doctrine, "a person
may challenge a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally
might be applied to him").
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The overbreadth doctrine, however, would be unavailing in a
constitutional challenge to § 3604(c) for the same reason that a facial
challenge would fail (i.e., most, if not all, of the statute's applications
would be constitutional). Indeed, for the overbreadth doctrine to be
invoked, a challenged statute must be substantially overbroad and not
readily interpreted to avoid protected speech.4"7 Also, the unavailability of
the overbreadth doctrine would be particularly apparent in those situations
where a landlord's harassing speech is considered "commercial,"4' 8 for the
Court has held that the overbreadth doctrine applies "weakly, if at all," in
commercial speech cases.4"9
This is not to say that a particular housing provider accused of
violating § 3604(c) by making a sexually harassing statement could never
prevail in asserting a First Amendment defense. Though we feel that most
such cases would result in upholding § 3604(c)'s constitutionality, our
discussions of both the commercial speech doctrine in Part III.C and the
captive audience doctrine in Part III.D recognize specific situations in
which applying § 3604(c) to a landlord's speech might raise serious First
Amendment concerns.410 As the Supreme Court noted in rejecting a facial
challenge to the residential picketing ordinance in Frisby,411 "the
constitutionality of applying the ordinance to such [specific] hypotheticals
remains open to question" and such specific-application questions "need
not [be] address[ed] today in order to dispose of [plaintiffs'] facial
challenge. "412 In like fashion, we readily concede that not every specific
fact pattern involving verbal harassment to which § 3604(c) might be
applied can be guaranteed at this point to be free of constitutional
problems.
To summarize, we believe that litigants are fully justified in asserting
§ 3604(c) claims of verbal housing harassment and that the exact
parameters of First Amendment protection for such statements should be
left for courts to develop over time based on the particular facts of
individual situations and the doctrines we have discussed above. In the
course of conducting these fact-specific reviews, courts should also bear in
mind "the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to
407. E.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462-63 n.20; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; see also
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482-83; id. at 491 (White, J., concurring) (accepting narrow
construction of ordinance in order to defeat overbreadth challenge).
408. See supra Part 11I.C.
409. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 n.20 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 380).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 298-305 (commercial speech) and 377-87
(captive audience).
411. 487 U.S. at 488.
412. Id.
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avoid constitutional difficulties." 413 Thus, to the extent that § 3604(c)'s
application to a particular instance of housing harassment would appear to
violate the First Amendment, the better course would be to construe the
statute not to apply to the defendant's behavior rather than to hold §
3604(c) unconstitutional.4 14 This approach-of limiting § 3604(c)'s scope in
individual cases to avoid conflict with the First Amendment-would be
especially appropriate under the FHA, which explicitly announces in its
introductory section that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States," 415 thereby evincing a special Congressional preference for the
statute to be applied with constitutional constraints in mind.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment in housing is a serious and probably widespread
national problem. Although such behavior is prohibited by a number of
provisions in the federal Fair Housing Act, the FHA has thus far not been
used as effectively as it could be to challenge sexual harassment, because
courts and litigants have relied primarily on only one of these provisions-
§ 3604(b)-whose coverage is similar to a comparable "terms and
conditions" provision in Title VII. The result, as the Seventh Circuit's
decision in DiCenso illustrates, is that only harassment deemed "severe or
pervasive" enough to meet Title VII standards is considered illegal under
the FHA, thus allowing landlords and other housing providers to engage in
a good deal of unwelcome verbal harassment without incurring liability.
This approach ignores the fact that the FHA includes another
provision-§ 3604(c)-that is significantly broader than its Title VII
counterpart and that, by its terms, outlaws discriminatory statements based
on sex. Because housing harassment almost always involves and indeed
often consists entirely of verbal statements, a good deal of such harassment
should be held to violate § 3604(c). Focused as it is on discriminatory
statements and without a "severe or pervasive" standard, § 3604(c) would
413. Id. at 483; see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 190, 211 (applying the principle that
courts should "not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which
to dispose of the case" (quoting Escambia County, Fla. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48,
51(1984)) and holding that Congress intended to exclude, perhaps based on First
Amendment concerns, defendant's newsletter from a speech-restricting statute and therefore
finding it unnecessary to "specifically address the constitutional question we granted
certiorari to decide"); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) (holding that courts
should "not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided").
414. See, e.g., HOME, 943 F.2d at 650-53 (rejecting particular application of §
3604(c) because it would have hinged on a construction of the statute that raised serious
First Amendment concerns).
415. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000) (emphasis added).
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seem to be a potent weapon for combating sexual harassment in the
housing context.
And yet, § 3604(c)'s potential has gone unrealized. To date, this
provision has been invoked in only two reported housing sexual harassment
cases, and in neither was § 3604(c)'s applicability treated as crucial to the
decision. The reason for ignoring § 3604(c) in these cases is hard to
fathom, for a close reading of this provision shows that the elements
required for its violation would seem to be present in most situations
involving verbal harassment. Nor should the potential for a First
Amendment conflict deter use of § 3604(c) in most harassment cases.
While free speech concerns must be taken seriously whenever a statute like
§ 3604(c) bars certain types of statements based on their content, we have
shown that most harassing speech outlawed by § 3604(c) should be
accorded little or no First Amendment protection.
Thus, the only reason for failure to make better use of § 3604(c) in
housing harassment cases seems to be the misguided sense among courts
and litigants that Title VII law provides a complete guide for the proper
application of the FHA in harassment cases. The purpose of this Article
has been to show the fallacy of this approach and to encourage a greater
reliance on § 3604(c) as a way of providing more protection to women
who are targeted for sexual harassment in their home.
857
